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
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MACV SEER REPORT

A SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF

PART I

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN)
VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC)
VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN).



QTR CY 70

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20 OCT 1970

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1. This report is prepared quarterly to provide COMUSMACV, MACV staff agencies and advisors with an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).
2. The content of the USMACV SEER Report is derived from operational statistics and responses to quarterly questionnaires submitted by senior advisors as a part of the MACV System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER). This part of the report contains ARVN/VNMC and VNN evaluations. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of this report is published under separate cover as Part II.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
USMACV SEER Report, Part I,
2d Qtr CY 70

Ronald A. Hall
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PART I: ARVN/VNMC AND VNN FORCES

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- C. Effort, Results and Caches Discovered
- D. Advisors' Assessment Tables
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1. (U-FOUO) INTRODUCTION.

a. Coverage. This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VMMC), the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) during 2d Qtr CY 70. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of the report is published as Part II. The status and performance of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) are covered in separate reports, the most comprehensive of which is the MACCORDS Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) Monthly Evaluation Summary Report.

b. Data and Information Sources.

(1) General. Operational statistics are derived from the SEER Monthly Operational Statistics Reports submitted to MACV by US advisors assigned to ARVN/VMMC units. Significant problem areas are reported quarterly by corps senior advisors. Assessments of operational effectiveness, leadership, training, staff functions and problem areas of ARVN and VMMC units are derived from advisors' responses to the SEER quarterly questionnaire. Enemy force strength data is obtained from MACJ2. Friendly force strength data is received from MACJ3 and the Territorial Forces Evaluation System. Input for the naval forces portion of this report is received from the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, and the Senior Naval Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, in the form of monthly and quarterly reports.

(2) Revised MACV SEER Questionnaire. This questionnaire was completely revised in late 1969 and provides a greater range of information for evaluating important areas of command interest in ARVN/VMMC effectiveness. In addition, the new questionnaire now has specific questions answered by advisors at all basic command levels (infantry and artillery battalion, regiment, brigade, division and corps). During the developmental stages, various field organizations were contacted for assistance and their recommendations incorporated into the final questionnaire. The new questionnaire was implemented on a test basis during the fourth quarter 1969 reporting period, providing an overlap of old and new data bases, and allowing the old and new results to be directly compared. The new questionnaire provides a more precise measurement of many attributes of ARVN/VMMC units covered by the old questionnaire, as well as expanded coverage into areas previously not considered. Hence, the evaluations derived from the two questionnaires are not identical, and those trend lines displayed in this report which cover several quarters may have a discontinuity in the 4th Qtr CY 69. Likewise, the fourth quarter evaluations shown on charts derived from the questionnaire are not those displayed in 4th Qtr CY 69 MACV SEER Report, but have been derived from the new questionnaire.

c. Factors Influencing Performance. Many factors, such as differences in terrain, size of areas, enemy/friendly density, level of activity, weather, and tactics employed by opposing forces affect the results as shown in this report.

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2. (C-NOFORN) SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE.

a. Effectiveness.

(1) Allocation of Effort. During second quarter 1970 the level of effort devoted to combat operations increased only slightly, and remains at approximately 61 percent, a high for the past two years, while time spent on active pacification increased to 7 percent. Security missions received only 16 percent of the ARVN/VNMC effort as territorial forces assumed more responsibility in this area. Time spent on training, reserve, and rehabilitation decreased slightly from the first quarter.

(2) Contacts and Enemy Initiated Incidents. Country-wide enemy contacts by ARVN infantry battalions totaled 2,481 in the second quarter, surpassing the first quarter figure of 1,979. The percentage of contacts with enemy units of platoon size or smaller decreased sharply from the first quarter to 73 percent, while battalion size contacts increased sharply from the first quarter to 13 percent. The major increase occurred in Military Region (MR) 2 at Dak Seang. (MR 2 reported no battalion size contacts in the first quarter.) There was an increase in the number of enemy initiated incidents against ARVN/VNMC units during the second quarter, a reversal of the previous downtrend and almost double the first quarter figure.

(3) Operational Results. Results during the second quarter in terms of enemy eliminated were the highest since 1968, due to increased enemy activity and the Cambodian operations. While the number of friendly KIA and MIA also exceeded the last quarter figures, the ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalion casualty ratio for the three month period reached a new high at 7.5:1. The number of weapons captured per battalion was also at a two year high, but the ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost decreased due to the large number of weapons lost at Dak Seang. Cache finds in Cambodia during the second quarter were much greater than previous finds, far exceeding the totals of any other reporting period.

(4) Operational Effectiveness. The US advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness are subjective evaluations of how well their units perform the mechanics of warfare and are not necessarily indicative of the operational results achieved by those units, which are also influenced by the environment, enemy, combat support received, and missions assigned. The average operational effectiveness assessment for the second quarter showed a decrease from the previous quarter with MR 2 units showing the largest overall loss. Ratings given the armored cavalry squadrons increased, reflecting their excellent performance in Cambodia.

(5) Unit Performance. Highlighted during the second quarter as top performance units were the 9th and 25th Divisions, and armored cavalry and Marine units. The 1st and 2d Divisions in Military Region 1 have traditionally operated in the area of greatest enemy activity and have previously been listed among the leading ARVN organizations; the country-wide increase

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in enemy activity plus the operations in Cambodia have allowed other units to achieve results as good or better than these MR 1 organizations, which continued to perform well.

b. Problem Areas.

(1) Leadership. The leadership evaluation of ARVN/VNMC is developed from the quarterly questionnaire submitted by advisors. The quality of leadership has generally improved during the quarter, but continues to be a problem among lower ranking officers and noncommissioned officers. Specialized leadership courses at division training centers and increased numbers of small unit operations are serving to correct this deficiency. This problem reveals itself in many ways, the most serious of which is the lack of aggressiveness demonstrated by many organizations. During the second quarter, 14 percent of the battalion advisors reported that their units were not aggressive when in contact with the enemy. The overall ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalion leadership assessment has decreased slightly during the second quarter because of a downward adjustment in MR 2 unit scores. The leadership problem continues to be reported as greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(2) Training. The total time spent in training by ARVN battalions decreased from the first quarter and remained low. The quality of training showed improvement during the second quarter, with all categories receiving a smaller percentage of "poor" ratings from advisors than in the first quarter. An accelerated program to provide battalion refresher training was planned for 1970, but increased combat activity caused cancellation of approximately half of this training.

(3) Inadequacies within Division, Regiment and Battalion Staffs. During the second quarter, substantial numbers of advisors still report G2/S2, G3/S3, and G4/S4 functions to be inadequate, with improvement being reported in division and regimental G1/S1 staff sections. A greater percentage of advisors reported inadequacies within battalion staffs than in regimental and division staffs.

(4) Intelligence. The intelligence function at all staff levels continues to be reported as a major staff problem. The intelligence collection effort of ARVN battalions is reported as less effective this quarter than during the first quarter, and the intelligence received from higher headquarters was frequently untimely.

(5) Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps. In the second quarter deaths from mines and booby traps decreased and since total friendly KIA increased, the percent of total casualties due to mines and booby traps decreased to 13 percent, the lowest percentage in the last 18 months. This overall decrease primarily represents a 60 percent reduction in deaths from these devices in MR 4, a reflection of extensive cross border operations where few such devices were encountered, of possible enemy supply difficulties in the Delta, and of a training program designed to reduce casualties from mines and booby traps.

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(6) Maneuver Battalion Strength. There was an increase in VNMC strength of approximately 700 men during the second quarter; the majority of this increase was reflected in the activation of an additional maneuver battalion. Strength in the major combat elements of ARVN decreased by approximately 2100 men. The training centers did not provide an adequate number of replacements to offset the increased number of battle casualties and desertions during the second quarter. The desertion rate in ARVN/VNMC major combat elements rose from thirty per 1000 assigned at the beginning of the second quarter to thirty five per 1000 assigned at the end of the second quarter. Desertions in the major combat elements of ARVN/VNMC continued to be a major problem and constituted the greatest single source of manpower loss in RVNAF. In some units the number of desertions was more than four times the number of combat losses.

(7) Logistics. Failure to properly exercise the ARVN supply system continued to be a major problem area. This is especially noticeable in that portion of the system dealing with requisitioning and distributing major items of equipment and spare parts. The number of artillery units reporting a shortage of spare parts as a major problem rose from 42 percent during the first quarter to 53 percent during the second quarter. The number of maneuver battalions reporting the same problems rose from 22 to 48 percent in the second quarter. Each MR reported at least one serious problem resulting from the unresponsiveness of the ARVN supply system. Many supply problems continued to be surfaced through advisor actions; the ARVN supply system remained unresponsive and frequently unaware of the requirements of the units it supports.

(8) Unit Performance. The 5th, 22d and 23d Divisions displayed relatively low performance during the quarter.

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
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3. (C-NOFORN) ARMY AND MARINE FORCES EVALUATION.

a. Environmental Aspects. On the following pages are environmental conditions and characteristics for each military region. These conditions are considered important in analyzing results and performance of ARVN/VNMC units. Charts 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the average numbers of enemy and friendly maneuver battalions present in each TAOR during the second quarter, relative strengths of enemy and friendly maneuver elements, and enemy and friendly densities in each TAOR. Friendly strengths are subdivided to show FVMAF, ARVN, and RF/PF-CIDG. Enemy strengths are subdivided to show NVA/VC infantry and guerrilla elements and are computed to include all enemy maneuver elements less headquarters. Arrows indicate previous quarter strengths.

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Chart 1



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MILITARY REGION 1 ENVIRONMENT

CONDITIONS


CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	The Chaîne Annamitique Mountains dominate the area. Rain forests covering the mountains offer refuge to the enemy. In the west, the Chaîne Annamitique grades into rolling upland plains, with altitudes between 1,500 and 3,000 feet above sea level. In the east, the mountains drop off sharply to narrow coastal plains.
Weather	The weather in MR 1 showed continuous improvement with the seasonal change from the northeast monsoon to the southwest monsoon during the quarter. During April, the MR experienced poor to marginal weather 66 percent of the time with the northernmost areas having the worst weather. In May and June the MR had good weather, with some scattered early morning fog and afternoon thunderstorms causing isolated marginal conditions.
Population	The majority of the population of about 3.1 million (17 percent of the national total) is settled along the coast. Da Nang and Hue are the only major cities in the area.
GVN Control	Relatively secure: hamlets 87.9 percent; population 91.3 percent.
Enemy Forces	The total enemy strength remained about the same as last quarter; there was an increase of one sapper battalion. The 1st Division's TAOR has the highest enemy density in country.
Friendly Forces	The total friendly strength remained about the same as 1st Qtr CY 70. CIDG strength of 3,313 is included in the RF/PF totals.

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Chart 2



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MILITARY REGION 2 ENVIRONMENT


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CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	The largest of the military regions, MR 2 is characterized by diverse terrain features consisting of coastal plains, highland plateaus, mountains and dense jungles. The area is, for the most part, sparsely populated and underdeveloped.
Weather	Coastal areas of MR 2 had good flying weather during the quarter with occasional low ceilings caused by shower activity. The highlands weather showed a slight downward trend due to the onset of the southwestern monsoon season. Early morning fog and clouds and afternoon thunderstorms were common; however, the flying weather remained generally good due to the marginal to poor areas being isolated occurrences.
Population	The majority of the population of about 3.2 million (18 percent of the national total) is settled along the coast. Qui Nhon and Nha Trang are the major cities of the coastal area. The population inland is largely Montagnard.
GVN Control	Relatively secure: hamlets 76.6 percent; population 86.9 percent.
Enemy Forces	Although the number of enemy battalions increased by one during the quarter, total enemy strength decreased by nine percent. The 25d Division's TAOR continued to have the lowest enemy troop density in-country.
Friendly Forces	The 25d Division's TAOR also had the lowest friendly troop density of all TAORs and STZs. There was a slight decrease in total friendly strength during the quarter. CIDG strength of 7,231 is included in the RE/PF totals. RE/PF increased by 2,526, while ARVN forces decreased by 1,014 and remained lowest of all military regions.

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MILITARY REGION 3 ENVIRONMENT


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CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	The MR 3 area is one of transition. The southern portion consists of rich, flat lands which flood during the rainy season. In the eastern regions, there are mangrove swamps, dense forest, and rubber plantations. In the northwestern areas, the terrain becomes mountainous with elevations up to 1,500 feet.
Weather	Generally good weather prevailed over MR 3 during the quarter. The southwest monsoon did produce an increase in the amount of rainfall. Since the rainfall was in the form of showers and thunderstorms, the flying weather was not appreciably affected.
Population	MR 3 has the second largest population, about 5.7 million (51 percent of the national total), and includes the national capital (Saigon) with a population of about 2.2 million.
GVN Control	Relatively secure: hamlets 95.4 percent; population 97.6 percent.
Enemy Forces	Total enemy strength decreased about eight percent from last quarter and the total number of battalions decreased by one.
Friendly Forces	Total friendly strength remained about the same as 1st Qtr CY 70. CIDG strength of 4,142 is included in the RF/PF totals. RF/PF and CIDG forces increased by 2,259, while ARVN/VNMC forces increased slightly.

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MILITARY REGION 4 ENVIRONMENT

CONDITIONS

CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain	MR includes the Delta of the Bassac and Mekong Rivers. The area is covered almost entirely with swamps, marshes and rice fields. The shoreline is marked by long stretches of mangrove swamps, beyond which mud flats stretch for some distance at low tide. Nearly all of the Delta is less than 10 feet above sea level, and the rise and fall of the tide is noticeable in the rivers and canals throughout the area. The unimproved areas of swamps, mangrove forest and jungle afford sanctuary to the enemy.
Weather	MR 4 experienced the same general weather pattern as MR 3. The southwest monsoon produced an increase in rainfall, but flying conditions were generally good throughout the region during the period.
Population	MR 4 has the largest population with about 6.0 million (54 percent of the national total). The Delta is the major farming area and producer of rice.
GVN Control	Relatively secure: hamlets 78.5 percent; population 87.0 percent.
Enemy Forces	There was a slight decrease in total enemy strength during the quarter, however enemy battalions increased by three. There was an increase in NVA and Sapper forces.
Friendly Forces	The 7th Division's TAOR continues to have the highest friendly troop density of all TAORs and STZs. Total friendly troop strength increased by three percent from last quarter. CIDG strength of 1,277 is included in the RI/PF total. RI/PF and CIDG forces increased by 5,255, while ARVN strength showed little change.

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b. Enemy Initiated Incidents.

(1) There was a 95 percent increase in enemy initiated incidents overall against ARVN/VNMC units during the quarter. This is a reversal of a downward trend which started during the 2d Qtr CY 69 (Chart 5).

(2) Chart 6 illustrates the number and type of incidents directed against ARVN infantry units, by military region, during the last four quarters. Daytime incidents constituted 66 percent of all incidents. Assessments of enemy initiated incidents by military region are as follows:

(a) Military Region 1. Enemy initiated incidents increased six-fold over last quarter. Ninety-six percent of MR 1 incidents were daylight attacks by fire, and 95 percent of MR 1 incidents occurred in the 1st Division's TAOR.

(b) Military Region 2. MR 2 once again experienced the greatest number of enemy initiated incidents. Sixty-seven percent of these incidents were attacks by fire, with the majority being daylight attacks. Incidents were about equally distributed between the two division TAORs.

(c) Military Region 3. MR 3 experienced the least number of enemy initiated incidents among the four MRs. Eighty-eight percent of all incidents were attacks by fire, with the majority occurring at night. Ninety-one percent of all incidents occurred in the 5th Division's TAOR.


(d) Military Region 4. Enemy initiated incidents more than doubled over last quarter. Sixty-eight percent of all incidents were ambushes, with the majority occurring during daylight hours. Ninety-two percent of all incidents occurred in the 7th Division's TAOR.

(3) Annex B contains a detailed tabulation of enemy initiated incidents.

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Chart 5

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS
AGAINST ARVN/VNMC




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Chart 6

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS



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c. Contacts.


(1) Country-wide enemy contacts by ARVN infantry battalions increased from 1,979 in the 1st Qtr CY 70 to 2,481 during the second quarter (Chart 7). MR 2 units once again experienced the least number of contacts among the MRs.

(2) The number of contacts with enemy units of platoon size and smaller increased five percent over last quarter; however, platoon size contacts constituted only 73 percent of total contacts as compared with 86 percent last quarter.

(3) Battalion size contacts increased seven-fold over last quarter. Approximately fifty percent of total battalion contacts were made by II Corps units during the Dak Seang Campaign. Ten percent of the battalion contacts were in Cambodia.

(4) Annex A contains a detailed tabulation of enemy contacts and results.

Chart 7



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d. Effort.

(1) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Country-wide. Chart 8 shows the average battalion effort on missions country-wide for ARVN/VNMC organizations, and trends since 1969. There was virtually no change in combat operations this quarter. Time spent on security decreased slightly, as did time spent in reserve, training and rehabilitation. Static pacification decreased slightly, while active pacification increased slightly.

(2) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Within Each Military Region. Chart 9 shows a comparison of time spent on each mission by ARVN infantry units, with an indication of the change since last quarter.

(a) Military Region 1. Total time spent on combat operations increased slightly. The 1st Division and 51st Regiment increased combat operations by seven and 17 percent respectively, while the 2d Division decreased the amount of time in this activity by 15 percent. Total time devoted to security missions remained approximately the same, but there was a better spread among units--the 51st Regiment's time on security decreased by 27 percent.

(b) Military Region 2. Overall combat operations by II Corps units increased from 25 to 42 percent. Most of this increase is attributable to the 22d Division. Time spent on active and static pacification was half the first quarter figure, but still constituted 22 percent of the total effort. Other missions registered only minor changes. II Corps units continued to devote the least amount of time to combat operations of any Corps.

(c) Military Region 3. Time spent on combat operations increased for the seventh consecutive quarter and was again highest in-country. III Corps units increased time on combat operations from 68 to 75 percent, with the 25th Division making the largest contribution. There were only slight overall changes in other categories.


(d) Military Region 4. Combat operations decreased from 62 to 56 percent, with the 21st Division making the largest drop. Half of the overall six percent drop in combat operations was shifted to active pacification. The 21st Division increased its support of active pacification from 10 to 17 percent.

(5) Comparison of Time Spent on Missions by ARVN Infantry Battalions. Table 1 shows the major ARVN organizations with the most or least time spent on each mission by their organic infantry battalions. Complete data indicating time spent on each mission is contained in Annex C.


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Chart 8

ARVN/VNMC PERCENT TIME SPENT
ON MISSIONS



DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT



19 Chart 9

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TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF TIME SPENT ON MISSIONS BY ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS

MISSION	MOST TIME	LEAST TIME
Combat Operations	1st Div (82%)	23d Div (39%)
Security	22d Div (49%)	25th Div (4%)
Active Pacification	25th Div (51%)	1st, 5th, 18th Divs (0%)
Static Pacification	23d Div (40%)	5th, 18th, 7th Divs 51st Regt (0%)
Reserve	23d Div (9%)	1st Div (0%)
Training	9th Div (10%)	51st Regt (0%)
Rehabilitation	9th Div (15%)	51st Regt (0%)

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c. Combined and Unilateral Combat Operations (Chart 10).

(1) The percent of time spent on combined (US/ARVN) combat operations decreased from the last quarter for all ARVN infantry divisions. All divisions, with the exception of those in MR 4, increased the percent of time devoted to unilateral combat operations.

(2) Military Region 1. MR 1 units had no change in total time spent on combat operations, although combined operations decreased from six to three percent and unilateral operations increased from 60 to 65 percent.


(3) Military Region 2. MR 2 units increased their time on combat operations from 25 to 42 percent. Time on combined operations decreased from three to one percent, while time on unilateral operations increased from 20 to 41 percent. All combined operations in MR 2 were conducted by 25d Division units.

(4) Military Region 3. MR 3 units total time on combat operations increased from 67 to 75 percent, although there was a drop from eight to two percent in combined operations.

(5) Military Region 4. All combat operations by MR 4 units were unilateral since there were no US combat units in the Delta. MR 4 units spent 56 percent of their time on combat operations.

Chart 10


COMBINED AND UNILATERAL OPERATIONS



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Chart 11



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
1. Results.

1) Enemy Eliminated. Chart 11 shows the country-wide average battalion results achieved by ARVN/AMC in terms of enemy eliminated (killed, captured and surrendered). In addition, friendly losses (killed and missing) and casualty ratios (ratios of enemy eliminated to friendly losses) are shown. Enemy eliminated, which had been in a gradual up-trend since 3d Qtr CY 69, took a sharp swing upward this quarter. Friendly losses rose slightly over last quarter, but the casualty ratio reached a new high of 7.5:1. The 1st, 2d, and 9th Divisions, and the armored cavalry, had the largest number of total enemy eliminated during the quarter. Chart 15 shows enemy eliminated per battalion for divisions and other major units.

2) Weapons Captured (Chart 11). The number of weapons captured (excluding caches) per battalion increased; however, the number of weapons lost was highest since 2d Qtr CY 69, which resulted in an unfavorable decrease in the weapons ratio for the quarter. The armored cavalry captured the largest number of weapons, followed by the 1st, 25th and Marine Divisions.


3) US and GVN Regular Forces Casualty Ratio. A comparison of US and GVN regular forces (ARVN/AMC, VNAF and VNNF) casualty ratios, based on country-wide statistics (Measurement of Progress data), is shown in Chart 12. The US ratio dropped while the GVN ratio increased during the quarter.

Chart 12



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Chart 15



▼ PREVIOUS QTR


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(4) Caches.

(a) Chart 14 indicates weapons found in caches by ARVN VMC units country-wide since 1st Qtr CY 69. The number of weapons found in caches increased almost eighteen-fold over last quarter. The largest find of weapons was in Cambodia by the 9th Division. Eighty-one percent of all cache weapons were found in Cambodia.

(b) The tonnage of food and ammunition found in caches is displayed in Chart 14. Fifty-eight percent of these items were captured in Cambodia. The 25d Division accounted for the greatest amount of food, and the 9th Division for the greatest amount of ammunition.

Chart 14



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(5) Ambushes. Chart 15 depicts the number of ambushes conducted by organizations of each corps during the second quarter.


(a) Military Region 1. A total of 19,961 ambushes were conducted by I Corps units during the 2d Qtr CY 70. Eighty-four percent of these ambushes were conducted at night. The 51st Regiment had the largest number of ambushes per battalion at 685.

(b) Military Region 2. II Corps units conducted a total of 19,723 ambushes, 92 percent of which were night operations. The 23d Division led in this area with an average of 627 per battalion.

(c) Military Region 3. A total of 23,815 ambushes were conducted by III Corps units during the quarter. Eighty-seven percent of these ambushes were conducted at night. The 18th Division had 887 per battalion.

(d) Military Region 4. A total of 9,724 ambushes were carried out by IV Corps units. Ninety-two percent of these ambushes were conducted at night. The 7th Division led in this area with 352 per battalion.

Chart 15




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g. Combat Support.

(1) Country-wide. Chart 16 depicts combat support provided to ARVN/VNMC from 3d Qtr CY 69 through 2d Qtr CY 70, as reported by battalion advisors. Tactical air/helicopter gunship sorties increased 39 percent while helicopter and fixed wing lift/MEDDEVAC/air supply sorties decreased 11 percent. Artillery support increased again this quarter and was the greatest amount provided in over a year. The percent of support attributable to RVNAF decreased in both categories of air support, but increased slightly in artillery support. Airborne battalions continued to be the greatest users of artillery, with the battalions of the 1st Division close behind. Airborne battalions are also first in helicopter gunship sorties, while 9th Division battalions have been provided the greatest amount of helicopter lift sorties.

Chart 16



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(2) Chart 17 shows the combat support provided to the ARVN in each military region.

(a) Military Region 1. Combat support employed by I Corps battalions increased in each category for the third consecutive quarter. The percent of artillery support provided by RVNAF increased to 80 percent compared to 77 percent in the previous quarter. The 1st Division received the greatest amount of artillery support in MR 1 and was the second greatest user among ARVN infantry organizations. The 1st Division also received the most helicopter lift and tactical air/helicopter gunship support in MR 1.

(b) Military Region 2. There was an increase in all combat support provided to II Corps units. RVNAF resources provided 88 percent of artillery support. Although this was a decrease from last quarter, there was an overall 55 percent increase in total artillery support provided. The 23d Division was the greatest user of all categories of combat support. RVNAF provided 23 percent of the helicopter lift support, a substantial increase over last quarter's 14 percent. RVNAF resupply sorties also increased substantially.


(c) Military Region 3. Combat support employed by III Corps battalions increased in each category except helicopter lift support. The 5th Division continued to employ the greatest amount of artillery while the 25th Division used the most helicopter gunship/tactical air support. RVNAF provided 88 percent of all artillery support, an increase from last quarter. RVNAF did not provide any helicopter lift sorties, but increased their MEDEVAC activity and air resupply.

(d) Military Region 4. Combat support provided IV Corps battalions decreased in all categories. However, the amount of artillery, helicopter lift and MEDEVAC support provided was the greatest of all the Corps. RVNAF resources continued to provide 100 percent of the artillery support, as well as 12 percent of helicopter/tactical air support, and 17 percent of helicopter lift support. Twelve percent of the MEDEVAC support was provided by RVNAF.

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Chart 17

COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED ARVN INF (PER BN)



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
h. Operational Effectiveness Assessments.

(1) The US advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness are subjective evaluations of how well their units perform the mechanics of warfare, and are not necessarily indicative of the operational results achieved by those units, which are influenced also by the environment, enemy situation, combat support received, and mission assigned. The average operational effectiveness for the second quarter showed a decrease from the previous quarter. Chart 18 shows the trend in the ARVN/VNMC average since the first quarter 1969. The discontinuity in the fourth quarter was caused by a change in evaluations given to ARVN units by advisors in the revised SEER quarterly questionnaire.

(2) Significant factors in the second quarter decrease were the lower assessments awarded the 21st, 22d and 23d Divisions, although two divisions showed improvement (7th and 18th), and one showed no change (5th) (see Chart 19). Among ARVN special organizations the armored cavalry squadrons showed a significant increase, reflecting their excellent performance in Cambodia, while the airborne, ranger and Marine units dropped off. Advisors' assessments of Marine units, however, remained highest in-country.


(3) Annex D contains detailed assessment tables derived from the quarterly questionnaire.

Chart 18



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Chart 19



▼ PREVIOUS QUARTER

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i. Division, Regiment and Battalion Staff Element Evaluations.


(1) Chart 20 compares the effectiveness of division and regimental staff functions among the four military regions on a percentage scale, and Chart 21 contains the same information for infantry battalion staffs. Ratings were computed for selected staff sections, the command and control function, and an overall command and staff average. A staff element, such as G1/S1, can be compared between military regions because advisors answered the same set of questions. Different staff elements cannot be directly compared because the ratings are based upon different sets of questions. The battalions have experienced greater difficulty in staff operations than divisions and regiments and are therefore portrayed separately. Staff element problem areas are analyzed by specific function in paragraph 4e.

(2) Regiments/Divisions (Chart 20). In the second quarter, MR 1 staffs again received the highest overall rating, with improvement over the previous quarter average. MR 2 staffs were rated below average in each area and exhibited a substantial loss in each staff function from the previous quarter. MR 3 staffs showed an overall regression, but were below average in only the G1/S1 staff function. MR 4 was below average in each area except command and control, yet showed an overall improvement from the previous quarter.


(3) Infantry battalions (Chart 21). MR 1 battalion staffs showed an improvement in each area from the previous quarter, and their overall rating was highest in country. MR 2 staffs were lowest overall, with every function showing a decrease from the first quarter. MR 3 staffs improved throughout except in the S1 area, and were above average in the overall rating. Except for the S1 area, MR 4 battalion staffs declined and were below average for every category.

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(Chart 20)



(Chart 21)



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j. Summary of ARVN/VNMC Performance Indicators.

(1) Chart 22 displays the comparative standings of the major ARVN/VNMC organizations according to six selected performance indicators. These six indicators are plotted around the ARVN/VNMC average on a scale determined by the distances by which the various indicators depart from the average. The chart is separated into three zones--above average, average, and below average--for purposes of discussion. Minor variations within each zone are not considered significant, although some major differences can be observed within the above average and below average zones. Also shown in the last column are the 1st Qtr CY 70 ARVN/VNMC indicator averages, which demonstrate the overall increase in results achieved this quarter. Organic reconnaissance companies and armored cavalry squadrons are included in division totals, hence many armored cavalry units are included in two organizations--their individual divisions and total cavalry. This duplication was not included in computing the averages, however. Of course, the chart does not consider all the ramifications involved in a total evaluation. The organizations are considered in three groups--top, middle and bottom--in discussing their relationship on the charts.

(2) The top group of ARVN/VNMC organizations during the second quarter contained the armored cavalry, the VNMC, and the 9th and 25th Divisions. The cavalry had five of its six indicators in the above average zone, and was highest among ARVN/VNMC organizations in enemy eliminated per battalion, weapons captured per battalion, and casualty ratio. The Marines, 9th and 25th Divisions each had four indicators in the above average zone, with the Marines having the best weapons ratio in-country. None of the top group had an indicator in the below average zone.

(3) The bottom group of ARVN/VNMC organizations during the second quarter contained the 5th, 22d and 23d Divisions. Each of these divisions had four indicators in the below average zone, one in the average zone, and one in the above average zone. The 22d Division was lowest of all ARVN/VNMC organizations in weapons ratio, and tied for lowest with the 23d Division in weapons captured per battalion. The 23d Division was also lowest in enemy eliminated per battalion and casualty ratio. Although the 5th Division was highest in weapons captured per enemy eliminated, it ranked next to bottom in three other indicators. The first quarter ARVN/VNMC average column would also fall into the bottom group this quarter, with three indicators in the average zone and three indicators in the below average zone. This indicates how much the second quarter operational results have improved over the first quarter results.



(4) The middle group contained the remaining ARVN/VNMC organizations: the 1st, 2d, 7th, 18th and 21st Divisions, the 51st Regiment and the airborne and ranger units. The 1st and 2d Divisions in MR I have traditionally operated in the area of greatest enemy activity and have previously been listed among the leading ARVN organizations; the country-wide increase in enemy activity plus the operations in Cambodia have allowed other units to achieve results as good or better than these MR I organizations, which continued to perform well.

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Chart 22

ARVN/VNMC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS



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k. Evaluation of Operational Performance of Infantry Divisions, Separate Regiments, and Special Organizations.

(1) General. The foregoing evaluations were primarily at corps or country-wide level. In order to provide a more detailed evaluation of the operational performance of ARVN and VNMK units, the following pages present charts and texts for each of the divisions, separate regiments and special organizations (airborne, ranger, armored cavalry and Marines). Organic reconnaissance companies and cavalry squadron results are included in division totals.


(2) Techniques. The evaluations are based primarily on second quarter and yearly trends in operational performance data. For each organization's evaluation, the discussion is organized in terms of environment, effort, combat support, results, operational effectiveness/leadership, and trends. Enemy density is based on the total estimate of maneuver unit strength plus guerrilla strength. In order to compensate for substantial differences in the number of battalions in a division or regiment, equivalent battalion figures are used for some indicators. The total number of equivalent battalions in an organization is obtained by adding together the number of infantry battalions, the armored cavalry squadron equated to a battalion, and the number of reconnaissance companies equated to a quarter battalion each. The number of equivalent battalions in Cambodia is obtained by dividing the number of battalion-days spent in Cambodia by 91, the number of days in the second quarter.

(3) Charts. The evaluation of each organization is illustrated by a chart containing combat support received, opportunity, results, and operational assessments. For those organizations which operated in Cambodia, two bars are used to indicate performance: the wide bars on the left which show overall performance during the entire quarter, with those portions achieved in the Republic and in Cambodia separately identified; the narrow bars indicate the relative efficiency of those units while involved in cross-border operations. An average zone is shown for each measure; variations within this zone are not considered significant and are termed "average". In addition, yearly trends are depicted for enemy eliminated, casualty ratio, advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership, and percent of effort on all missions.


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
Chart 23



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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1ST DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density in the 1st Division's TAOR showed no change from the first quarter and was the highest in-country at 2.21 per square kilometer. This includes the greatest NVA density. Friendly density also remained constant at 5.80 per square kilometer.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations by the division rose from 75 percent in the first quarter to 79 percent in the second quarter. Reserve and rehabilitation time was reduced from eight percent in the previous quarter to less than one percent in the second quarter. Time devoted to training decreased slightly to less than three percent of the total effort. The 1st Division, like all MR 1 units, did not operate in Cambodia.

Combat Support. The division increased the use of combat support during the second quarter and was at or above the average zone in all support categories. The number of tactical air and helicopter gunship sorties more than doubled from the previous quarter. This increased support is reflected in the division's hours of contact, which tripled the first quarter's amount.


Results. The 1st Division's hours of contact were at the ARVN average this quarter. The number of enemy eliminated more than doubled but was still average. The number of weapons captured followed this rising trend and was also average. A comparison between the number of weapons captured and the number of enemy eliminated shows that 33 weapons were captured for every 100 enemy eliminated. This 1:3 ratio is one of the better ratios in-country. The casualty ratio decreased from first quarter but was still within the average zone. The drop in the casualty ratio was caused by the nature of their operations, i.e., the establishment of fire bases in the rugged mountains and clearing the enemy from around these bases.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The division's operational effectiveness and leadership assessments dropped slightly from last quarter, but were still among the highest in ARVN.




Trends. The number of enemy eliminated more than doubled over the last quarter. The division's ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost was one of the better in-country. The 1st Division is in or above the ARVN average zone for all performance indicators. MR 1 units have traditionally operated in the area of greatest enemy activity and have likewise been among the leading organizations in performance; the recent country-wide increase in enemy activity, plus operations in Cambodia, have allowed other ARVN/VNMC units to achieve results comparable to MR 1 organizations, which continued to perform well. The 1st Division should continue to be one of the most effective organizations in ARVN.

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Chart 24






TRENDS



OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
AND LEADERSHIP
TRENDS
1969 1970

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



RESERVE TRAINING AND REHABILITATION
TRENDS
1969 1970

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2D DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density in the 2d Division's TAOR is down slightly as it is country-wide. The friendly density increased during the quarter to 5.10 per square kilometer.

Effort. There was a slight increase in time devoted to offensive operations during the second quarter. The 2d Division was the third highest of all ARVN units in time spent in active support of pacification. Time spent on security decreased to 27 percent of the total effort. The 2d Division, like all MR 1 organizations, did not operate in Cambodia during the second quarter.

Combat Support. The numbers of artillery rounds and tactical air and helicopter gunship sorties increased over the previous quarter and were average. The number of helicopter lift sorties decreased from the first quarter but remained within the ARVN average zone.

Results. The 2d Division's hours of contact increased and were average this quarter. The numbers of enemy eliminated and weapons captured increased considerably, but did not exceed the ARVN average. The casualty ratio decreased from the previous quarter, but remained within the average zone. The ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost was second lowest in-country. The 5th Regiment took the greatest losses within the division during the second quarter, but all regiments of the 2d Division achieved excellent results.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of the division's operational effectiveness fell slightly from the previous quarter. The leadership assessment improved slightly from last quarter.

Trends. The 2d Division reversed its downward trend of the past three quarters in the number of enemy eliminated. The division is within the ARVN average zone in all performance indicators. The operational effectiveness assessment has dropped for the third consecutive quarter. The 2d Division should continue to be one of the best performers in ARVN, although its second quarter results were only average.


CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 25


51ST REGT -- 2D QTR CY 70



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

51ST REGIMENT

Environment. Enemy density decreased slightly this quarter to 1.47 per square kilometer. Friendly density was reduced to 5.50 per square kilometer.

Effort. Time spent on offensive operations rose from 42 percent the first quarter to 65 percent this quarter. Time spent on security was reduced from 58 percent to approximately 32 percent this quarter, but was still highest in-country. Time devoted to training during the second quarter was nil. The 51st Regiment did not go into Cambodia.

Combat support. All categories of combat support increased over the previous quarter, but two of the three remained below the ARVN average zone. Even with this increase in the use of combat support, the hours of contact remained well below the ARVN average and were approximately the same as in the first quarter. The 51st Regiment used the least amount of helicopter lift of all ARVN/VNMC organizations, except for the armored cavalry.


Results. The number of enemy eliminated during the quarter doubled and was in the average zone. The number of weapons captured increased, but was below average. The ratio of enemy eliminated per hour of contact was best in ARVN/VNMC, but the number of weapons captured per enemy eliminated was second lowest in-country. The casualty ratio improved this quarter and is in the average zone.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of operational effectiveness dropped slightly this quarter, but was still third best in ARVN/VNMC. This indicates that, in the opinion of its advisors, the 51st Regiment has executed the mechanics of warfare well and that it may not do better unless substantial changes are made in its mission and/or environment. The leadership assessment also fell slightly, but was well above average.


Trends. The 51st Regiment's results improved during the second quarter 1970. The numbers of enemy eliminated, weapons captured and enemy to friendly casualty ratio are on uptrends for the second consecutive quarter. It is too soon, however, to tell if the improvement is permanent or merely a reflection of increased enemy activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 26




TRENDS



PERCENTAGE OF EFFICIENCY
NOTE: DATA IN CHART BASED ON 1969-1970 YEAR-TO-DATE DATA
EFFICIENCY RATES ARE

PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

22D DIVISION

Environment. Energy density in the 22d TAOR decreased slightly to .46 per square kilometer and is third lowest in the Republic. Friendly density remained constant at 2.50 per square kilometer, second lowest in country.

Effort. For the first time since 1st Qtr CY 69, the 22d Division devoted more time to combat operations than to pacification support--42 percent of its time was devoted to combat operations and 28 percent to security. The division spent a total of 150 battalion-days in Cambodia during the second quarter.

Combat Support. There was an increase in each type of combat support provided, with helicopter lift, tactical air and helicopter gunship sorties being in the average zone. This is a reflection of the substantial increase in combat operations. Approximately 40 percent of the lift sorties were utilized in Cambodia; the Cambodian helicopter lift rate was highest in ARVN VMC. Other Cambodian support rates were average.



Results. Hours of contact and enemy eliminated more than doubled over last quarter, but were still below the average zone. The number of weapons captured also increased but was below average. The casualty ratio decreased, despite the increase in enemy eliminated, because of the high number of casualties sustained by the 42d Regiment at Dak Seang. The 22d Division captured 185 weapons while losing 222 during the second quarter for a ratio of 0.85:1, the worst in-country. In Cambodia, the division achieved below average results except for the casualty ratio, which was average.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The advisors' assessments of operational effectiveness and leadership decreased considerably from the first quarter, and were below average.

Trends. The number of enemy eliminated increased sharply as a result of the Dak Seang campaign. The casualty ratio decreased drastically after a year-long uptrend. The 22d Division's operational effectiveness and leadership ratings resumed their downtrends after last quarter's temporary reversals. The division continued to be a below average performer.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 27



CONFIDENTIAL

23D DIVISION

environment. Enemy density decreased to .26 per square kilometer. Friendly density remained at the same level as last quarter, 1.80 per square kilometer. The 23d Division's LAOR has the largest area and the lowest enemy and friendly densities in the Republic.

effort. The division's effort devoted to offensive operations decreased slightly this quarter and was lowest in-country. Forty percent of the effort was claimed by reserve and security operations. The division spent 170 battalion days in Cambodia.

combat support. Although still well below average, combat support increased in each category. The 23d Division used the least amount of artillery and the second least amount of tactical air and helicopter gunship support of all ARVN/ANMC organizations. Approximately 50 percent of all support was used in Cambodia, where its utilization rates were average.

results. The division's hours of contact doubled and results followed this upward trend. Despite these increases, however, the 23d division was lowest in ARVN/ANMC in all three result categories shown. The 23d also had the second lowest enemy eliminated per hour of contact. The results achieved in Cambodia were also well below average. The 34th Regiment's results were highest in the division.


operational effectiveness/leadership. The operational effectiveness assessment dropped for the second straight quarter and was lowest in ARVN/ANMC. The leadership assessment continued its year-long decline, and is now second lowest in-country.

trends. The number of enemy eliminated increased slightly after last quarter's sharp decrease. The casualty ratio also increased slightly, but has remained below average for the past year. Operational effectiveness and leadership continued on their downtrends.




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Chart 28




5TH DIV — 2D QTR CY 70



TREND



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



18

CONFIDENTIAL

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5TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density decreased to .70 per square kilometer. Friendly density decreased to 4.69, reflecting the redeployment of the US 1st Division.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations by the 5th Division rose from 72 percent to 76 percent, second highest of all ARVN infantry divisions. No time was devoted to support of pacification. The division's reconnaissance company, armored cavalry squadron, and 9th Regiment spent a total of 183 battalion days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. The 5th Division made increasing use of combat support in the second quarter, and was slightly above average in use of artillery support. Those elements operating in Cambodia used their combat support at even higher rates, but remained within the Cambodian average zones in all support categories.

Results. The 5th Division continued to perform below the ARVN/VNMC average. The hours of contact and number of weapons captured per battalion increased from the first quarter, but enemy eliminated and the casualty ratio decreased. The 5th Division was next to the bottom in hours of contact, enemy eliminated and weapons captured, and had the third lowest casualty ratio of all ARVN/VNMC organizations. The low casualty ratio again is attributed primarily to a high number of friendly casualties from mines and booby traps. Those elements operating in Cambodia had more hours of contact, more enemy eliminated and more weapons captured per battalion than those units operating only in-country, but their Cambodian casualty ratio was even lower than in the Republic. All the measures were substantially below the ARVN/VNMC Cambodian averages.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 5th Division's operational effectiveness and leadership assessments were in the ARVN/VNMC average zones. This indicates the division is executing the mechanics of warfare adequately, and that it possibly may not achieve more satisfactory results in its current environment. It should be noted that the 5th Division has two highly mobile and aggressive US units operating in its TAOR and competing for contact with the available enemy. This condition also existed in Cambodia.

Trends. The 5th Division's performance, in terms of enemy eliminated per battalion, has been on a downtrend since the third quarter, the only time it exceeded the ARVN/VNMC average. The casualty ratio continued to drop after a strong fourth quarter. The weapons captured per battalion has recovered from a six month downtrend, but is still well below average. The 5th Division is one of ARVN's poorest performers, and any immediate improvement in operational results remains questionable.


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Chart 29


18TH DIV — 2D QTR CY 70



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

18TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 18th Division's TAOR decreased to .44 per square kilometer, and was second lowest in-country. Friendly density remained constant at 4.44 per square kilometer.

Effort. The 18th Division's percent of time on combat operations remained constant at 73 percent, with no effort being spent in support of pacification. The division continued to devote only a small amount of time to security (12 percent), as the RF/PF performed much of this mission. Elements of the 18th spent a total of 190 battalion-days in Cambodia during the second quarter.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support were below average in the Republic, and only artillery support was average in Cambodia, although artillery, tactical air and helicopter gunship support increased from the first quarter. The usage rates for tactical air, helicopter gunships, and helicopter lift were the lowest of all units operating in Cambodia.

Results. The number of hours of contact per battalion more than doubled from the previous quarter, but was still slightly below the ARVN/VNMC average. The number of enemy eliminated and weapons captured almost tripled the first quarter results, but were still only barely in or just below the average zones (which had increased dramatically). The casualty ratio increased to 18.0:1 and was highest of all ARVN divisions. This is attributable, in part, to the lowest number of friendly KIA in ARVN/VNMC, although this statistic almost doubled from last quarter. The 18th's Cambodian rates for enemy eliminated and weapons captured per battalion were much better than its in-country rates, but were still at or below the ARVN/VNMC Cambodian averages. The casualty ratio for units operating in Cambodia was above average, and better than the overall division ratio.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness and Leadership assessments of the 18th Division increased for the second quarter, and were well above average. This indicates the 18th Division has executed the mechanics of warfare well, as is verified by its improved operational results.

Trends. The 18th Division remained below average throughout 1969, and thus far in 1970, in enemy eliminated and weapons captured. The division has been above average in casualty ratio for the last four quarters. Operational effectiveness has improved for the last two quarters, as has the leadership assessment. The 18th Division has achieved a solid position near the ARVN/VNMC average.


CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 30


25TH DIV - 2D QTR CY 70



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

25TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 25th Division's TAOR increased to 1.74 per square kilometer, third highest in the Republic. Friendly density increased to 9.20 per square kilometer, reflecting gains in RF/PF strength, and was also third highest of all division TAORs.

Effort. The 25th Division's effort was mainly devoted to offensive operations, a category in which it led all ARVN/VNMC organizations. A substantial portion of these operations, moreover, was devoted to active support of pacification. Elements of the 25th spent a total of 335 battalion-days in Cambodia, second highest of all ARVN infantry divisions. Only four of its infantry battalions failed to see action in Cambodia.

Combat Support. The 25th Division employed 74 percent more artillery support than in the first quarter, but was still the second lowest user of all ARVN/VNMC organizations. The division used 16 percent less tactical air and helicopter gunship support than last quarter, but was still the second biggest user in ARVN/VNMC. The 25th also used 44 percent less helicopter lift than in the first quarter, and is just within the average zone. The use of combat support by elements in Cambodia was substantially below the ARVN/VNMC Cambodian average.

Results. The numbers of enemy eliminated and weapons captured per battalion were about twice the first quarter levels, and were well above the ARVN/VNMC average. Hours of contact also increased, but remained within the average zone. In Cambodia, the 25th Division's rates for enemy eliminated and weapons captured were also within the Cambodian average zones, and were much greater than the 25th's overall rates. The casualty ratio was second highest of all ARVN infantry divisions at 15.4:1, and varied little in-country or in Cambodia.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Both the operational effectiveness assessment and the leadership assessment fell off from the first quarter, but remained slightly above the ARVN/VNMC averages, which also declined. However, most small unit leaders who participated in the Cambodian cross-border operations improved in capability over the previous quarter.

Trends. The increases in enemy eliminated and weapons captured, which began in late 1969, continued into the 2d Qtr CY 70 and were the best achieved by an MR 3 organization. The casualty ratio has fallen off slightly from the 4th Qtr CY 69 high, but is still the second best achieved by any ARVN division. The division's operational effectiveness and leadership evaluations remain high due to extensive small unit operations and the Cambodian operations. During the past year the 25th Division has emerged as one of ARVN's best divisions, and continues to improve.


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Chart 31


7TH DIV — 2D QTR CY 70



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

7TH DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density, 2.17 per square kilometer, was second highest in-country, and decreased slightly during the quarter. Friendly density in the division's EAOR was the highest in-country at 14.69 per square kilometer, increasing with the growth of RF/PL strength.

Effort. The percent of time devoted to offensive operations remained constant at 55 percent, while security missions took 23 percent of the division's effort. The division's armored cavalry squadron spent 24 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. The number of artillery rounds fired in support of the battalions increased by more than 60 percent and was within the average zone. The use of helicopter gunship and tactical air support increased, but remained below average. The amount of helicopter lift decreased, but remained above the country average. In Cambodia, the division utilized no artillery or helicopter lift support, but used tactical air and helicopter gunship support at about the same rate as in the Republic.



Results. The 7th Division overall results indicators were in the average zone for the second quarter, and the number of enemy eliminated increased by 80 percent from the previous quarter. This was accomplished with an average amount of contact, even though the amount of contact more than doubled from the first quarter. The number of weapons captured also increased significantly. The 7th Division had the third highest friendly losses per battalion. This was caused, in part, by heavy casualties from mines and booby traps and the enemy's overrunning of ESB Schroeder in April. In spite of this, the division's casualty ratio improved slightly. In Cambodia, the rate of enemy eliminated was the highest of all ARVN/VNMC units, and the casualty ratio was well above the ARVN/VNMC average. The rates for hours of contact and weapons captured were average.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness evaluation of the 7th Division jumped dramatically this quarter, as the new division commander had his units execute better the mechanics of warfare. The division's leadership assessment also increased with the replacement of two regimental commanders during the second quarter.

Trends. The number of enemy eliminated and weapons captured increased from last quarter. The 7th Division's casualty ratio has been on an upward trend for the past two quarters. The division continues to suffer a high rate of casualties from mines and booby traps. The operational effectiveness and leadership trends of the 7th Division have shown positive improvement, and are average this quarter (despite the small amount of time spent in Cambodia).

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 32



CONFIDENTIAL

9TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density in the 9th Division's TAOR decreased to 1.02 per square kilometer. Friendly density increased to 9.60 per square kilometer due to RF/PP increases, and was second highest in the Republic.

Effort. Time on offensive operations decreased during the quarter to 61 percent, while time in training was highest in-country at seven percent. The 9th Division was the second highest of all ARVN/VNMC units in time spent on reserve and rehabilitation (17 percent). The 3d Battalion, 15th Regiment underwent refresher training in June. The division spent 381 battalion-days in Cambodia, with all but one battalion seeing action out-of-country. This was more time in Cambodia than recorded by any other ARVN division.

Combat Support. The 9th Division used 44 percent fewer helicopter lift sorties than the previous quarter, but was still the biggest user in ARVN/VNMC. Use of artillery, tactical air and helicopter gunship support decreased to average levels. In Cambodia, the division used its helicopter lift support at a higher rate than in country, and at the second highest rate of all ARVN/VNMC units.


Results. The 9th Division's hours of contact per battalion increased considerably and the number of enemy eliminated per battalion was the second highest in-country. The number of weapons captured per battalion was above average and their casualty ratio was above average despite the fact that the 9th Division was second highest of all ARVN/VNMC units in the number of friendly losses per battalion. All results indicators were higher in Cambodia than in the Republic, and were at or above the Cambodian averages. The number of enemy eliminated per hour of contact was second best in Cambodia.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 9th Division's operational effectiveness assessment remained at about its first quarter level, but its leadership assessment dropped from the previous quarter. However, these assessments were still above average.


Trends. The numbers of enemy eliminated and weapons captured have increased steadily since 3d Qtr CY 69, as has the 9th Division's casualty ratio. Operational effectiveness and leadership assessments dropped slightly during the second quarter, but were still above the country-wide average. The 9th Division has improved in overall performance and effectiveness, and should continue to be one of ARVN's best divisions.

Chart 33


21ST DIV - 20 QTR CY 70



1140



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

21ST DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density increased during the quarter to .72 per square kilometer. Friendly density also increased, which was a reflection of an increase in RF/PF forces.

Effort. Time spent on offensive operations decreased by 10 percent from the previous quarter. However, time devoted to active pacification increased by almost seven percent, second highest in-country. The 21st Division also spent more time on reserve and rehabilitation than any other division. Ten elements of the division spent a total of 83 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. The 21st Division used about the same amount of combat support as the previous quarter, with a slight increase in the number of tactical air and helicopter gunship sorties and a slight decrease in helicopter lift sorties. In Cambodia, however, units of the 21st used their combat support at a much higher rate than in-country, being at or above the ARVN/VNMC Cambodian averages for both types of air support.


Results. The 21st Division's hours of contact decreased slightly from last quarter. The enemy eliminated at 89.9 per battalion was much higher than the first quarter, but was only average as the ARVN/VNMC average increased even more. The number of weapons captured exhibited a similar pattern, with an increase from the first quarter, but with no change in relative position compared to other ARVN/VNMC units. The division's casualty ratio increased dramatically with a reduction in friendly casualties, and is now average. Units of the 21st Division in Cambodia met or exceeded the ARVN/VNMC Cambodian averages in all results categories, achieving the highest number of weapons captured per battalion and the best casualty ratio of any division operating in Cambodia.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness and leadership assessments decreased during the quarter and were below average. This indicates that, while the division's operational results are improving, the 21st has an undeveloped potential for doing even better, given improved leadership and better execution of the mechanics of warfare.


Trends. The trend lines of the 21st Division are erratic, crossing and recrossing the ARVN/VNMC average lines. The enemy eliminated has improved for the second quarter which, combined with a reduction in friendly losses, has created a much improved casualty ratio. Operational effectiveness and leadership have taken a downward swing and are now below average. The 21st Division continues to maintain a position near the ARVN/VNMC average.

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
Chart 34



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



CONFIDENTIAL

AIRBORNE DIVISION

Environment. During the early part of the second quarter, battalions of the Airborne Division continued operating with the US 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in northern MR 3. Two brigade headquarters and all nine battalions were involved in Cambodian operations and, for the first time, the division had its own area of operations, consisting mostly of dense jungle.

Effort. The percent of time spent on combat operations increased slightly to 73 percent. Time devoted to security remained unchanged from last quarter, but the combined time spent in training, reserve and rehabilitation increased to 16 percent. No time was devoted to support of pacification during the second quarter.

Combat Support. Although there was a decrease in all types of combat support, the Airborne Division still used the greatest amount of artillery support and twice as much tactical air and helicopter gunship support as any other organization in-country. Their use of helicopter lift sorties dropped 50 percent. Elements of the division spent 274 battalion-days in Cambodia, where they used artillery, tactical air and helicopter gunship support at the highest rates in ARVN/VNMC.

Results. Hours of contact doubled from last quarter and were almost twice as great as the next highest organization. The number of enemy eliminated increased slightly, but the casualty ratio dropped as friendly casualties increased to the highest rate per battalion of any unit in-country. The casualty ratio was second worst among ARVN/VNMC units, while the number of enemy eliminated per hour of contact was ARVN's worst. The number of weapons captured was in the average zone, but the ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost was second best in ARVN/VNMC. The number of weapons captured per enemy eliminated was also above average.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The operational effectiveness assessment of airborne units dropped for the third straight quarter, but was still above average. The leadership assessment improved this quarter, reversing a two-quarter downtrend.

Trends. Enemy eliminated has moved upward for the second consecutive quarter. However, friendly casualties also increased, which resulted in a decrease in the casualty ratio. Weapons captured has been on the rise since 4th Qtr CY 69. The downtrend of the operational effectiveness evaluation began to level off this quarter. The leadership assessment has taken an upswing this quarter. The Airborne Division showed a substantial gain in operational results during the first quarter, after initial setbacks following a long period assigned to CMD security. However, recent performance has been erratic and future improvement cannot be predicted.

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Chart 35

ENEMY ELIM BY AIRBORNE BATTALION




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CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 36


ENEMY ELIM BY
ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS




CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 37


CAVALRY (TOTAL) — 2D QTR CY 70



TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



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ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

Environment. The 17 cavalry squadrons were employed throughout the four military regions during the quarter. One squadron is organic to each of the 10 divisions, and the remaining seven operate under corps control. All but the four I Corps squadrons spent some time in Cambodia.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations increased again this quarter, but still remained below average at 59 percent. Many units continued to perform extensive security and reserve missions, which accounted for a large portion of the cavalry's effort (39 percent) during the quarter. Time devoted to training was below average. Armored cavalry squadrons spent a total of 462 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. All categories of combat support increased and were average, except for helicopter lift, which is little needed by armored units. The greatest increase was in the use of tactical air and helicopter gunship support, which doubled for the second consecutive quarter.



Results. Hours of contact doubled and remained above the ARVN average, due primarily to the large number of hours of contact in Cambodia by III and IV Corps squadrons. Enemy eliminated and weapons captured increased more than four-fold, again due to the Cambodian campaign. The casualty ratio was the best among ARVN organizations at 23:1.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership increased significantly, reflecting the excellent performance in Cambodia.

Trends. Enemy eliminated, which had been on an upward trend, but below average since 4th Qtr CY 69, took a sharp swing upward this quarter and was highest in ARVN/VNMC. The cavalry's casualty ratio had also been on the increase since 4th Qtr CY 69 and continued to be highest among ARVN organizations. The operational effectiveness and leadership assessments moved upward for the first time since 3d Qtr CY 69, reversing previous downtrends.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 38



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MARINE DIVISION

Environment. During April, Marine battalions operated on a rotational basis in MR 4 under two brigade headquarters. Brigade "A" was under OPCON 21st Division and Brigade "B" operated under OPCON 7th Division. On 9 May, Brigade "B" under OPCON CTG 194.0 moved into Cambodia while Brigade "A" continued to work with the 21st Division. On 28 May, Brigade "A" replaced Brigade "B" in Cambodia. During this quarter the 8th Battalion completed its training and became operational, while the newly formed 9th Battalion commenced its initial training.

Effort. Marines continued to spend a high proportion of time (79 percent) on combat operations. They spent 213 battalion-days in Cambodia.

Combat Support. Artillery and helicopter lift sorties decreased, while tactical air and gunship sorties increased. A relatively small percentage of combat support was used in Cambodia, where a greater percentage of enemy were eliminated and weapons captured.

Results. All results were at least double last quarter's, and were well above the country averages. The Marines had the best weapons captured to weapons lost ratio at 435 to 0.


Operational Effectiveness, Leadership. Operational effectiveness decreased slightly during the quarter, but still remained highest in-country. Leadership ratings increased slightly and were also highest in-country.

Trends. The Marine Division's operational results, which had been on a general uptrend since 3d Qtr CY 69, took a sharp upswing during 2d Qtr CY 70 and were well above average. The Marine units have achieved results comparable to ARVN's best units, and should continue to do so.

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Chart 39

ENEMY ELIM BY MARINE BATTALION




68

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


Chart 40

ENEMY ELIM BY RANGER BATTALION



CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 41



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RANGERS

Environment. The 20 Ranger battalions are located throughout the four military regions. Thirteen of these battalions spent a total of 269 battalion-days in Cambodia this quarter.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations increased by approximately 15 percent to 55 percent, but still remained below average. Time devoted to security dropped to 27 percent. Training also dropped slightly but remained above average.

Combat Support. Combat support increased and was in the average zone in each category except helicopter lift sorties. Less than 20 percent of all combat support was used in Cambodia where the Ranger battalions spent 14 percent of their time.

Results. Operational results were at or above average this quarter, with numbers of enemy eliminated and weapons captured making substantial increases. Better than 50 percent of these results were achieved in Cambodia. MR 2 units had the greatest number of enemy eliminated per battalion, due primarily to their participation in the Dak Seang campaign. Their weapons captured figure, however, was extremely low. MR 1, 2, and 3 battalions had a good balance between enemy eliminated and weapons captured at 3.7, 3.4 and 3.6 to 1 respectively.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Operational effectiveness and leadership assessments dropped for the first time since the 3d Qtr CY 69. The unit with the greatest drop was the 23d Battalion which was heavily engaged in the Dak Seang campaign.

Trends. Enemy eliminated continued the upward trend which started in 4th Qtr CY 69. The casualty ratio, which dropped slightly since last quarter, was still within the average zone. After a steady increase, which began during the 3d Qtr CY 69, the operational effectiveness and leadership assessments decreased.


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4. (C-NORON) ARVN/VNMC Problem Areas.

a. General. Major objectives of SEER are to identify weaknesses and problem areas which reduce combat effectiveness and, through analytical methods, determine courses of action by which RVNAF, with MACV assistance, may increase the effectiveness of their forces. This section contains major problem areas reported by senior advisors to ARVN units, and MACV staff actions taken to assist in resolving the problems. In addition, this section contains major problems highlighted in the MACV analysis of ARVN/VNMC organizations.


b. Infantry Battalion Strength. Overall ARVN/VNMC strength decreased by approximately 2,000 during the second quarter to 431,000, approximately 31,000 above the authorized level (Chart 42). Personnel in the pipeline decreased by two percent to 94,000 with over 47,000 in training and schools. The large number in the pipeline continued to limit the personnel available in combat organizations. There was an increase in VNMC strength of approximately 700 men during the second quarter; the majority of this increase was reflected in the activation of an additional maneuver battalion. Chart 43 shows the authorized and average assigned strength of ARVN infantry battalions by division. The total assigned strength of ARVN infantry units decreased by 2,100 during the second quarter, and was 23 percent below authorized levels. The 9th Division has the lowest assigned strength with a 36 percent shortfall, while the 25th Division is highest with 10 percent. Shortages were approximately 10 percent in late 1968 and first quarter 1969.

Chart 42



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
Chart 43



c. Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps.

(1) Mine and booby trap casualties continue to be a serious problem in ARVN/VNMC. In the second quarter, deaths from mines and booby traps decreased and, since total friendly KIA increased, a decrease in percent of total casualties due to mines and booby traps resulted. Chart 44 depicts the magnitude of the problem during the last six quarters.


Chart 44



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(2) Chart 45 presents data on this problem for each major organization. The problem has been particularly acute for MR 1 and MR 4 units, including the VMC, as well as the 22d and 5th Divisions. There was a 60 percent reduction in deaths from mines and booby traps in MR 4 during the second quarter, a reflection of command effort on training to reduce casualties from these causes, extensive cross border operations where few such devices were encountered, and possibly of enemy supply difficulties in the Delta.

Chart 45



▼ PREVIOUS QTR AVG

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d. Battalion Problem Areas.

(1) During the second quarter, advisors to the ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions and armored cavalry squadrons submitted responses to questions contained in the MACV SEER Questionnaire which indicated potential problem areas. Chart 46 depicts the percent of advisors indicating their units performed inadequately in selected areas. The percentages are based on the frequency of responses from approximately 374 questionnaires. SEER problem area evaluations include only battalions, since the areas of concern are based on problems which exist primarily at that level. Certain problems show noticeable differences between ARVN infantry battalions and special units (airborne, Marines, cavalry and rangers) and, while not indicated on the chart, these are noted in the comments below. The problem areas in the order they appear on Chart 46 are as follows:

(2) Inadequate Dependent Housing. Dependent housing has been a continual concern of ARVN, and major efforts to improve its quantity and quality are being made. Conditions have improved slightly from the fourth quarter, but 72 percent of advisors still consider the amount of housing to be inadequate, and 54 percent reported the quality as inadequate. Special units report slightly more problems in dependent housing than ARVN infantry battalions.


(3) Reinforcement. Twenty-four percent of the advisors reported that their units failed to reinforce elements in contact with adequate speed and in sufficient strength half of the time or more, a regression from the previous quarter. The problem is as serious in special units as in ARVN infantry battalions.

(4) Intelligence. The intelligence function in ARVN battalions has presented major problems as indicated by the responses concerning timeliness, collection efforts and security leaks. Forty-eight percent of advisors report that the intelligence received by the unit was untimely 50 percent or more of the time during the second quarter. Efforts to collect intelligence was judged inadequate in 13 percent of the units; the special unit percentage being greater than that of ARVN infantry. While not displayed on the chart, it is noted that advisors reported most units as reacting appropriately to available intelligence most of the time, with 17 percent reporting it as a problem. There is reason to believe that the enemy is sometimes forewarned of the unit's combat operations by security leaks. Approximately 25 percent of the advisors reported this area as a problem, with the percentage in ARVN infantry organizations being half again greater than that of special units.

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Chart 46-I

BATTALION PROBLEM AREAS PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS:




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CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 46-II

BATTALION PROBLEM AREAS
PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS



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(5) Leadership. NCO leadership capability is reported as a greater problem than officer leadership, with 11 percent reporting a problem in the second quarter, an improvement from the previous quarter. Company grade officer leadership ability was reported as inadequate by five percent of the advisors during the second quarter. The leadership problem is greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(6) Desertions. Desertions are a continuing problem in ARVN, and have been receiving command emphasis. However, unit commanders' actions designed to cope with the desertion problem are reported to be inadequate in 11 percent of the ARVN maneuver battalions, a significant increase from the previous quarter. The problem is not as great in special units.

(7) Aggressiveness. Fourteen percent of the advisors reported that units fought aggressively one half of the time or less, a regression from the previous quarter. This problem is slightly greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(8) Indecisive Actions. Some unit commanders failed to take decisive action when the opportunity arose. Approximately 18 percent of the advisors reported this occurred 50 percent or more of the time in the second quarter, with the problem the same in ARVN infantry battalions as in special units.

(9) Spare Parts Availability. The availability of spare parts was reported to be inadequate in a large number of units. This problem is particularly serious in artillery battalions, which reported critical shortages of parts for mission essential items such as fire control equipment, panoramic telescopes, and firing mechanisms. Some combat vehicles of armored cavalry squadrons, and vehicles and weapons in all type units were deadlined for lack of spare parts. Advisors report the supply system has been distorted by failure of units to requisition items known to be in short supply, purchase of parts on the local economy, procurement of parts by advisors, and failure of units to distribute available parts to the user. The solution of the problem lies in making the supply system work; adequate supplies of repair parts are reported in-country in the supply system, but are not properly requisitioned and distributed. In those parts of Chart 46 dealing with spare parts unavailability and untimely requisitions, artillery units have been added and cavalry squadrons portrayed separately from other maneuver battalions to emphasize the seriousness of this problem in those units.

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c. Staff Problem Areas.

(1) Chart 47 covers selected staff functions reported as inadequate in the SEER questionnaire by advisors to ARVN/ANMC organizations. The problem area functions are grouped separately by maneuver battalion staffs, and by regiment, group, brigade and division staffs, since battalions usually have experienced greater difficulty in staff operations than higher units. While the analysis includes all staff functions for completeness, the G1/S1 and most of the G4/S4 functions appear to be operating effectively due to the low number of advisors reporting these as problems.

(2) G1/S1 Functions. The personnel and morale functions of higher staffs have shown some improvement during the last quarter, with a slight regression being reported for battalion staffs. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings for the G1/S1 section in the following categories:

(a) Maintains organization strength, keeps records, and arranges for replacements.

(b) Supervises personnel management by classifying, assigning, promoting and transferring troops.

(c) Develops and maintains morale through personnel services, decorations and awards, and graves registration.

(3) G2/S2 Functions. The intelligence functions for all staffs have shown little improvement since the fourth quarter. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G2/S2 section in the following categories:

(a) Supervises, coordinates, and plans intelligence collection activities.

(b) Processes intelligence information through recording, evaluation, and interpretation, and disseminates intelligence.


(c) Plans and supervises counterintelligence activities.

(4) G3/S3 Functions. The operations and training functions have shown erratic behavior since the fourth quarter, particularly in the area of training programs. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G3/S3 section in the following categories:

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Chart 47-1


G1/S1, G2/S2 STAFF FUNCTION PROBLEM AREAS
PERCENTAGE OF ADVISORS REPORTING INADEQUATE



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Chart 47-II

G3/S3, G4/S4 STAFF FUNCTION PROBLEM AREAS
PERCENTAGE OF ADVISORS REPORTING INADEQUATE



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(a) Analyzes missions, recommends priorities for utilization of manpower and equipment, and recommends requirements for tables of equipment and organization.

(b) Analyzes the training situation and proposes and implements training programs.

(c) Analyzes the tactical situation, develops courses of action, and makes recommendations to the commander for operations.

(5) G4/S4 Functions. The logistics functions show little improvement since the fourth quarter, with battalion staffs regressing in supply and maintenance. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G4/S4 section in the following categories:

(a) Determines requirements for, procures, stores and allocates supplies.

(b) Makes provision for adequate medical support.


(c) Formulates, coordinates and supervises maintenance and repair programs.

f. Training Assessment. Training programs continue to receive emphasis in developing ARVN/VNMC effectiveness. To provide more depth, the revised SEER questionnaire has expanded the coverage of the training function, and this additional information is provided in this evaluation.

(1) Training Effectiveness. The 2d Qtr CY 70 training effectiveness evaluations presented in Chart 48 are based on advisors' responses to 16 different questions on frequency of training programs, results from training programs, and the manner in which training programs are conducted. MR 1 organizations displayed an overall improvement from the previous quarter, and were above the ARVN infantry average. MR 4 units improved from the first quarter but remained below average, due primarily to the assessments of the 9th and 21st Divisions. The rangers and Marines regressed this quarter, while the airborne and armored cavalry units showed significant improvement.

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Chart 48



▼ PREVIOUS QUARTER

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(2) Training at Division Training Schools and National Training Centers (Chart 49). The quality of training at division training schools and National Training Centers is being addressed for the first time in the revised SER questionnaire. Advisors report improvement since the previous quarter; however, 13 percent rate such training to be in the "poor" category.

(3) Training to Reduce Casualties (Chart 49). Training to reduce casualties has been separated into two categories: mine and booby trap casualties, and casualties from other causes. The number of advisors reporting the quality of training to reduce mine and booby trap casualties as "poor" dropped to 18 percent. Reports rating the training to reduce other casualties as "poor" decreased to 13 percent. Both categories, however, showed a significant decrease in the amount of "good" quality training.

(4) Training of Officers and NCOs (Chart 49). The evaluation of the quality of training received by company grade officers and unit NCOs remains high. The number of advisors reporting "poor" quality training decreased to 15 percent for officer training and 24 percent for NCO training. The quantity of in-place leadership and responsibility training received by company grade officers and unit NCOs decreased from the first quarter.

(5) Training to Improve Combat Skills (Chart 49). The quality and quantity of training to improve combat skills has improved slightly from the first quarter. During the second quarter there was a reduction from 22 to 21 percent of the advisors who reported this training to be "poor", and a reduction from 56 to 50 percent who stated their units conducted such training for 50 hours or less during the entire quarter.


(6) Marksmanship Training (Chart 49). As in other training areas, the quality of marksmanship training has improved this quarter, but 25 percent of the advisors still rate the training to be "poor." The amount of marksmanship training has increased since the previous quarter. The number of units receiving no marksmanship training dropped from 20 to 12 percent.

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
Chart 49

ADVISORS' ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING


QUALITY OF TRAINING:



COMPANY GRADE OFFICER & UNIT NCO TRAINING



TRAINING TO IMPROVE:




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(7) Time Spent on Training By ARVN/VNMC Battalions.

(a) Training Time. Time spent by ARVN organizations on training has decreased since last quarter. This reflects total time devoted by battalions to training and provides for combining the time spent by smaller units into battalion days. Time spent on major training programs, such as national and division level training, is also included. Chart 50 reflects a decrease in total time spent on training since the fourth quarter, a reversal of the 1969 favorable trend. There was, however, considerable variation in the time reported by each organization, with none reported by the 51st Regiment, and over seven percent by the 7th and 9th Divisions.

(b) Refresher Training. Training programs for the maintenance of unit combat proficiency are conducted at training centers as unit refresher training (a four week course for infantry battalions), or as command supervised in-place training. Each unit is required to complete refresher training once every three years. Chart 51 shows the percent of ARVN infantry battalions and special units which have either completed battalion refresher training since 1967 or are scheduled to receive it in 1970. The 1st Division is the only organization having its battalion training completed for the three year period. An accelerated program to provide refresher training was planned for 1970, but increased combat activity caused cancellation of approximately half of this training.

Chart 50




FIGURES INDICATE PERCENT OF TIME DEVOTED TO TRAINING

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
Chart 51

ARVN/VNMC REFRESHER TRAINING

ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION



SPECIAL UNITS



COMPLETED SCHEDULED-1970 OVERDUE

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g. Action on Second Quarter Problem Areas. Previous editions of this publication addressed problem areas reported by senior advisors in two parts. One part contained problems which were submitted during the previous quarter and a discussion of the actions taken on these problems. The other part simply listed the problems submitted during the current quarter. In this and subsequent reports, only current quarter problems and actions taken will be covered.

(1) Problem: There is an immediate requirement for 5 ton dump trucks to replace 2 1/2 ton dump trucks in combat engineer battalions.

Comment. Replacement of 587 Offshore Procurement Japan (OSPJ) 2 1/2 ton dump trucks with M51A2 5 ton trucks is included in modernization plans for FY 71. The remainder will be replaced by the end of FY 75. The M614 2 1/2 ton dump trucks will be replaced through attrition, with a projected residue of 556 on hand at the end of FY 76. Current assets status of 2 1/2 ton and 5 ton dump trucks is as follows:

<u>AUTHORIZED</u> <u>(All Types)</u>	<u>OSPJ</u>	<u>ON HAND</u> <u>M614</u>	<u>M51A2</u>	<u>ON HAND</u> <u>TOTAL</u>
2148	911	622	639	2172

(2) Problem. Serious shortages exist for panoramic sights for 105mm and 155mm howitzers.

Comment. The delayed return of 74 sights from CONUS repair facilities has contributed significantly to the current shortage. The cause of the delay has been identified and replacement supply action is being expedited. However, availability dates have not, as yet, been determined. Advisory action is being taken to increase the repair capability of Direct Support/General Support (DS/GS) and depot maintenance support, to include increased US technical assistance. Additionally, action is being taken to assure that cyclic maintenance float authorizations are adequate.

(3) Problem. Serious shortages of 105mm illuminating rounds (C449).

Comment. 105mm illuminating rounds are in critical supply status (below 30 days of supply) country-wide. On 20 July, 600 rounds were airlifted from the 3d Area Logistical Command (ALC) to the 1st. Subsequently, a transfer from USARV made an additional 5000 rounds available at Da Nang. These transfers, plus original quantity on hand, has provided over 60 days of supply in MR 1 to meet demands until the arrival of the following scheduled shipments: (30 days of supply for the 1st ALC is 2466 rounds).

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ETA</u>	<u>SHIP</u>
5,950	26 Aug 70	AS 40
3,000	28 Aug 70	AS 52
3,000	5 Sep 70	AS 53

(4) Problem. ARVN lacks sufficient air delivery equipment to adequately support operational requirements.

Comment. ARVN is authorized 1500 each A-22 cargo bags and G-12 cargo parachutes. These assets, held by the 91st Aerial Supply Company in Saigon, can support delivery of 80 short tons per day for 19 days or under modified planning requirements can sustain delivery of 50 tons per day for 35 days. Slow recovery of this equipment from drop zones is reducing availability of O/H assets and precluding timely determination of equipment losses. Delayed requisitioning of replacement items further reduces the capability of the Aerial Resupply Company. Sufficient equipment is available to support the level of operations currently being experienced by ARVN. Effective management of current equipment resources requires:

(a) Command emphasis on speedy recovery and return of aerial resupply equipment from drop zones.

(b) Continued stressing of timely preparation and submission of equipment loss reports.

(5) Problem. Serious shortage of automotive mechanics tool sets.

Comment. The total in-country on hand quantity of 8,050, as of 1 August 1970, is sufficient to satisfy current requirements. Redistribution of assets within MR 1 should resolve the shortages. An additional 549 tool sets are expected during October 1970. These receipts, plus on-hand quantities, will satisfy projected ARVN requirements during FY 71.

(6) Problem. The ARVN replacement system lacks the flexibility to meet the demands of heavy casualties incurred in a short period of time and to maintain acceptable strength levels.

Comment. This problem was studied in detail during the Personnel System Evaluation (PSE), reference Combined Directive MACV JD 1-70 and JGS 600-104, dtd 4 Apr 70, subject: RVNAF Personnel Systems Evaluation (PSE). Specifically, problem V-A-2, page 27, Volume V, addresses the lack of ready replacements for heavy unprogrammed losses. The eight volume study was distributed in June 1970 and JGS is currently implementing its recommendations on an established priority basis. A replacement pool cannot be established until combat unit assigned strength approaches authorized strength. Infantry strengths estimated for 31 July 1970 were:

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Div/Egt	1	2	51	22	23	5	18	25	7	9	21
Percent	81	83	85	80	77	91	90	95	81	82	77

Part of the shortfall in MP 2 was due to a lack of recruiting:

UNIT	QODIA (Jan-Jun)	RECRUITED
22d Div	7,567	471
23d Div	5,862	671

(7) Problem: Desertions continue to constitute the major drain on ARVN manpower resources in II Corps.

Comment: The Highlands Study was a MACV study to determine what could be done to enhance morale in Pleiku and Kontum (CSA #5849-69). The study resulted in ten recommendations which were presented to JGS for action. The ten recommendations were:

- (a) Assign best personnel available to units in the Highlands.
- (b) Provide sufficient replacements to maintain full authorized strength, using only Category A, physically fit replacements.
- (c) Put command emphasis on prompt payments.
- (d) Intensify effort to improve commissaries.
- (e) Encourage frequent visits by senior officers.
- (f) Establish a fixed reassignment policy.
- (g) Guarantee 15 days leave with transportation.
- (h) Program POLWAR activities on regular basis.
- (i) Improve postal service.
- (j) Provide additional dependent shelters.

These recommendations were coordinated with JGS, and on 26 January 1970, a letter was received from DCSPER/JGS listing the progress and actions taken. The only item rejected was the assignment of only Category A personnel because not enough are available. Action is being taken on the remaining recommendations to improve personnel services and hopefully improve morale.

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(8) Problem. Recruiting goals for MR 2 are too high.

Comment. (See paragraph (6) above). J1/JGS assigns quotas as goals. They may be exceeded. The quotas are established by computing the unit's needs based upon average strength and expected losses for the quarter. Expecting a shortfall, J1/JGS assigns additional quotas for MR 2 units to Recruiting and Induction (R&I) Centers, offices and branches. Total shortfalls must be replaced from other sources, e.g., conscripts, deserter laborers, delinquents. While the quotas may be unrealistic for MR 2, the numbers actually recruited by each division are the lowest in ARVN. Advisors should stress the importance and necessity for recruiting. The Mobilization Directorate has received instructions to increase the quota of conscripts from approximately 3,000 to 9,000 for July, August and September. The first effects will not be felt until October due to training and processing time.

(9) Problem. Leadership is the greatest single problem facing ARVN. Problems in the areas of training, operations, logistics and personnel stem largely from leadership shortcomings.

Comment. As authorized force levels are achieved, the procurement and promotion systems should achieve some stability. As authorized grades are achieved more selectivity will be possible when assigning officers. JGS Promotion Directive #030-400 provides a promotion system based on merit. Maximum use of battlefield and special promotions should be emphasized. Time in grade requirements for 1LT through O4 are reduced to six months for battlefield and 1 year for special non-battlefield promotions. Decentralization of promotion authority is resisted by JGS to avoid favoritism which is reduced by using a centralized promotion board.

(10). Problem. LRRP operations throughout MR 2 during the quarter have been generally defensive in nature.

Comment. Subsequent to the filing of the 2d Quarter SHER Report, a complete reorganization of the Ranger Service Arm has been accomplished. Within this reorganization the 2d Ranger Group has been given control of twelve Ranger Border Defense Battalions which are currently being organized under TOE 5-606 (distributed 28 Jun 70) which authorizes one Long Ranger Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) per battalion. Upon completion of this reorganization, scheduled to be completed in 4th Quarter CY 70, the 2d Ranger Group will have the LRRP resources of the twelve Ranger Border Defense Battalions to fulfill its long range reconnaissance requirements. This mission statement specifies how the LRRPs are to be utilized; however, in the final analysis, utilization of assigned personnel is the prerogative of the commander.

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(11) Problem. Inability to analyze Intelligence Report (IR) information received at Division level.

Comment. A concept was developed and tested during the first half of CY 70 that provides assistance to the ARVN Special Technical Detachments and permits the Senior, Deputy, G2 and G3 Advisors access to Special Intelligence. Presently, the 1st ARVN Division's selected advisors have this support. Action is underway to provide three more divisions with assistance teams to include access to Special Intelligence for the Senior, Deputy, G2 and G3 Advisors. This concept will expand to all ARVN Divisions by the end of CY 70.

(12) Problem. Shortage of ponchos and fatigues.

Comment. 2 ALC has recently received ponchos. As of 1 August 1970, the 121st Field Depot, supporting II Corps, did not hold any "due outs" for ponchos. The "get well" date for fatigues is September 1970; approximately 400,000 uniform sets will be produced during July, August, and September. The nationwide shortage of sateen, resulting from inflationary procurement costs has aggravated the country wide shortage of fatigues. Under a MASF support program, 200,000 yards of a total 1,659,290 yards, of sateen were delivered to RVNAF in July 1970. Additional increments are anticipated for August and September.

(13) Problem. Shortage of aerial resupply rigging equipment.

Comment. Issue of rigging equipment to units without TOE authorization, for satisfaction of special operational requirements, has produced corresponding shortages in units with requisitioning authority. MASF requirements for subject equipment is based on ARVN TOE authorizations. Management of this equipment by TOE authorization does not recognize many temporary operational requirements and will continue to limit total in-country assets. Quartermaster Corps Plans Advisory Division (QMCPAD), in coordination with Corps G-4s, will conduct a study, utilizing demand history and usage factors to establish a common TA for rigging equipment. Approval of this TA will allow requisitioning according to demand.

(14) Problem. Shortage of water purification equipment sets.

Comment. Office Chief Engineer (OCE) records reflect that two of the 5000 gallon per hour capacity sets have been issued to the 22d Engineer Battalion of the 22d Infantry Division. Further advisory action is being taken with OCE to bring the division up to the authorized quantity of three. MACV records indicate that ARVN has water purification sets on hand in excess of TOE/TA allowances. However, only 5 of the 35 authorized 600 GPH sets (FSN 4610-914-4622) are on hand. The remaining assets are substitute 5000 GPH set (FSN 4610-190-0301).

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(15) Problem. Shortage of combat boots.

Comment. Anticipated receipts during August should eliminate due-outs. As of 1 August 1970, 11,557 pairs of jungle shoes were due-out from the 151st Field Depot. On hand balances (all sizes) stood at 5,893 pairs. Three thousand (3,000) pairs are in transit from the 10th QM Base Depot.

(16) Problem. There is a shortage of breech block sub-assemblies, e.g., M1 Firing Mechanisms and obturator spindles in the 155mm howitzer battalion of the 23d Division Artillery.

Comment.

(a) Firing Mechanism, M1: There are a total of 43 on hand at the 20th Ordnance Support Base Depot (OSBD) which are being issued only to satisfy deadline requisitions. Receipts at the depot are reasonably frequent but low in quantity. Attention to good maintenance practices at the organizational level is particularly appropriate at this time. Units should request the parts to repair the mechanisms when the body is serviceable. Frequent field strip cleaning and oiling will significantly prolong the service life of the mechanisms. To avoid failure, headspace must be correctly adjusted to insure proper seating in the breech block.

(b) Obturator Spindle: Receipts of new spindles are not expected until December 1970 due to a world-wide shortage. Spindle (NSN 1025-520-7652) is repairable and the 80th OSBD is scheduling the repair of this item. Therefore, unserviceables must be evacuated through support maintenance without delay. Preventive maintenance procedures must be closely monitored to assure normal service life. Attention to correct headspace adjustment will forestall mechanical failure.

(17) Problem. In order to ensure an effective sensor program, the authorization of sensor qualified advisory personnel in the line divisions should be reviewed and, where appropriate to the division's deployment, increased; similarly ARVN division authorizations should be reviewed.

Comment. As the HCHH JAW Program expanded in size and scope the need for authorized sensor qualified advisors was realized. During April 1970 it was determined that a requirement existed for two officers and three enlisted personnel per ARVN division. However, subsequently it was determined that sensor-qualified personnel should be provided from current assets rather than expand the JFA. A current action is underway to determine the feasibility of requesting that sensor orientation be given to individuals assigned to advisory duty before arrival in theater, and/or conducting a short course in each MR for advisors, present and future. In regard to providing sensor orientation to individuals assigned to advisory

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duty before arrival in theater, a course in Unattended Ground Sensor is available at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona. Graduates of this course are identified by an L9 suffix to their MOS. Each HQ MR has been requested to identify advisory spaces requiring an L9 suffix. Further, there is a five day Unattended Ground Sensor course at the Combined US/RVNAF Sensor School at Vung Tau.

(18) Problem. The quality of US advisors continues to be a problem. The advisor replacement turbulence is now approaching critical levels. In III Corps during 2d Qtr CY 70, assigned majors dropped to 53 percent of authorized strength and captains to 78 percent. There is an increasing shortage of lieutenant colonels.

Comment. On 19 June 1970 Army Advisory Group (AAG), MR 3 was assigned 2d priority among MR AAG. Prior to that time MR 3 AAG had been the 4th priority among MR AAG. As a result of this realignment the MR 3 advisory personnel situation should improve significantly. During the remainder of July and August, 5 LTCs, 20 Majors, and 55 Captains are programmed for MR 3 AAG. All LTCs are command recommended. There is a shortage of majors and captains throughout MACV. DA has agreed to support MACV majors and captains currently authorized at 100 percent, with exceptions of three branches; Infantry, Engineer, and Military Intelligence. These branches will be supported at 75 percent of current authorization. Branch substitutions will be made to fill the remaining 25 percent authorization. DA has started sending additional majors and captains but MACV will not be up to authorized strength until Dec 70. Projected officer strength, to provide an overall fill of 88 percent, for MR 3 AAG on 31 Aug 70:

- (a) COL - 5
- (b) LTC - 28
- (c) MAJ - 56
- (d) CPT - 115
- (e) 1LT - 94
- (f) WO - 8

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(19) Problem. Insufficient parts for M113 APC.

Comment. Repair parts in a low stock status are being individually managed by Office Chief Ordnance (OCO) and monitored by Ordnance Advisory Division (OAD) supply managers. Emphasis will be continued for all combat vehicles repair parts so long as shortages exist. Although the abnormally high demands imposed by recent operations have taxed the supply system, support has been responsive. For example, the 4th ALC Advisor Weekly Track Vehicle Deadline Report, 22 July 1970, shows only three M113 APCs non-operational for parts. In MR 4, 98.1 percent of these vehicles were operational.

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5. (C-NOFORN) Vietnamese Naval Forces Evaluation.

a. Introduction.

(1) This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). The report is based on the Naval Forces Evaluation System (NFEES), a subsystem of SEER.

(2) In measuring the operational effectiveness of the VNN there are three major areas of interest:

(a) Improvement and Modernization.

(b) Operational Performance.

(c) Operational Results.

(3) Although quantifiable results frequently overshadow the quantifiable ones, a general feel for the situation can be obtained by examining the factors that make up these areas.

(4) A glossary of acronyms is included at the end of the section.

(5) In the interest of deleting non-essential reports and functions, continued publication of this section of SEER is currently under study.

b. Summary of Performance.

(1) Effectiveness.

(a) Craft turn over are on schedule.

(b) Supply center performance is satisfactory.

(c) The VNN measure of effort (craft employment) was satisfactory during the quarter.

(d) Due to the low level of enemy activity in MR I and MR II, and the troop support and refugee operations conducted in Cambodia, the operational results attained were below the previous quarter. Coastal surveillance craft results were higher during the quarter as more craft were turned over to the VNN and the weather in the Northern part of the country improved.

(e) The VNN assumed command of operation Giant Slingshot during the quarter and operation Ready Deck has become a VNN operation with no USN forces assigned except advisory personnel. Four of the major operations are commanded by VNN officers and all operations are scheduled to be under VNN command by February 1971.

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(2) Problem Areas.

(a) Forces are short officers and petty officers because of the rapid expansion of the VNN. Ninety percent of the officer strength is programmed to be attained by May 1972 and ninety percent of the petty officer strength is scheduled to be attained by the end of CY 71.

(b) Civilian repair facilities and shipyard strengths remain below a satisfactory level. In June the VNN was allowed to resume hiring civilian personnel to fill the authorized vacancies. However, a shortage of skilled personnel may result in augmentation of the repair facilities and shipyard with military personnel.

(c) A recruiting shortfall was experienced during the quarter as a result of JCS delay in recruiting authorization. The lack of recruits resulted in an overall shortfall in training input and graduates. The VNN was allowed to resume recruiting personnel in May, and the training program is now returning to its programmed level.

c. Improvement and Modernization.

(1) Improvement and Modernization will be measured by examining:

- (a) Craft Inventories.
- (b) Personnel Strengths.
- (c) Training.
- (d) Logistics.

(2) Craft Inventories.

(a) Actual and planned VNN combat and logistics lift craft inventories are shown in Table 2. Craft assets are made available to the VNN through Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) deliveries and turn over of in-country USN assets. The craft turnover is on schedule.

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TABLE 2

ACTUAL AND PLANNED VNN CRAFT INVENTORIES

CATEGORY	END OF CY 69	ON HAND 30 JUNE 70	PROGRAMMED CY 70	ULTIMATE
Coastal Surveillance				
PC, PCE, PGM, MSC	30	32	32	32
PCF, WPB	41	91	126	128
JUNKS	226	228	228	228
DER/WHEC	0	0	0	4
River Security/Interdiction				
PBR	88	250	293	293
MLMS/LCMM	16	16	16	16
LSSL/LSIL	11	11	11	11
Escort Craft	28	28	28	28
River Assault/Interdiction				
RAG Craft	202	202	202	202
RAID Craft	108	184	222	225
Logistic Lift				
LST, LSM, LCU, YOG, AKL	<u>20</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>33</u>
Total Craft	770	1069	1187	1200

(b) Chart 52 shows the cumulative craft turnovers to the VNN since 1 January 1969. During the second quarter 285 combat and logistics craft were added to the VNN inventory bringing the cumulative craft turnovers to 502 since January 1969.


(3) Personnel Strength. Chart 53 shows the VNN personnel strength expansion from first quarter 1969. The personnel strength is 38,155 and is composed of 2,215 officers, 6,950 petty officers, and 28,990 enlisted. The number of personnel in the pipeline (15,052) is still high due primarily to personnel in training. The VNN exceeded their authorized strength of 31,645 in anticipation of the FY 71 strength authorization of 39,611.

(a) Ship, craft and support activity personnel manning levels are displayed in Table 3 as percentages of TOE allowances. These manning levels are shown for the FY 71 strength authorization.

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Chart 52


USN CRAFT TURNED OVER TO VNN
(CUMULATIVE SINCE JAN. 1969)



► TURN OVER GOAL

Chart 53

VNN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED



PIPELINE

OTHER

--- AUTHORIZED

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TABLE 3
PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>AS OF 20 JUNE 70</u>
Coastal Surveillance	
Officer	55%
PO	49%
Enlisted	126%
TOTAL	93%
River Security/Interdiction	
Officer	69%
PO	34%
Enlisted	95%
TOTAL	76%
River Assault/Interdiction	
Officer	46%
PO	21%
Enlisted	96%
TOTAL	65%
Logistic Lift	
Officer	110%
PO	65%
Enlisted	106%
TOTAL	94%
Pipeline, Training Facilities, and Activities	
Officer	29%
PO	65%
Enlisted	297%
TOTAL	135%
Civilian Repair	64%

(b) All categories, except logistic lift, are short of officers and petty officers. The FY 71 strength of 32,611 requires approximately 6,000 officers. Ninety percent of this requirement is projected to be attained by May 1972. The most severe management problem in the VNN is the shortage of qualified petty officers. For the FY 71 strength 13,000 petty officers are required. Ninety percent of required petty officer strength is expected to be attained by November 1971.

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(c) Civilian Repair Facility and shipyard strengths remain below a satisfactory level. The shipyard civilian personnel allowance was increased to 5110 during early 1970 and the Minister of Defense approved a wage increase to stimulate recruiting of the additional personnel. However, during the period from March 1970 to June 1970 the Vietnamese government froze the shipyard civilian work force manning level at 2205 personnel. The hiring restriction was removed in early June; but, there are few skilled workers available to fill the jobs. Should the shortage of skilled personnel continue, the shipyard work force will require augmentation by military personnel.

(4) Training. Training programs to support asset turnover and to upgrade the competence level of the VNN fell short of their goals during the second quarter. A delay in the recruiting authorizations from JCS during April resulted in a shortfall of recruits in training programs. This shortage of recruits during the first part of the quarter resulted in a shortage of trainees for other programs throughout the remainder of the quarter. Cumulative inputs to the training programs, as percentages of the number of personnel programmed to start training, are shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

TRAINING

<u>APPLY</u>	<u>30 JUN CUMULATIVE CY 70 INPUTS</u>
Recruit	63%
Basic Specialist	91%
Advanced Specialist	122%
Petty Officer	40%
Managers	97%
Warfare Officer	145%
Aviation Language	82%
Base School	26%
On-the-Job Training, Crew	70%
On-the-Job Training, Other	
Base Crew	73%
Off-Shore (outside the Country)	98%

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(a) The petty officer school continues to suffer from a shortage of students. Of the 1,270 programmed for the quarter, 668 were filled, a shortfall of 602. The shortfall was greatest in June when only 175 of a 620 quota was filled. Commanding Officers are reluctant to nominate personnel to attend petty officer school since loss of these personnel further reduces their already low manning levels.


(b) In the English Language school a shortfall of 17 percent (77 students) for the 2d quarter is attributable to a shortage of inputs in the month of April. This was caused by a late start in Class "A" school resulting from a lack of recruits in the first quarter of CY 70.

(c) Similarly the Boat School is suffering from a shortage of students because of the recruiting problem in the first quarter of the year. The shortage is more evident here (shortfall of 73 percent) due to the higher assignment priority of other programs.

(d) The shortfalls in on-the-job training programs were also due to the shortage of recruits available early in the quarter. June quotas were either filled or exceeded.

(e) Chart 54 shows the total inputs and outputs for the quarter and the number of personnel in training at the end of the quarter. The programmed goals were not met due primarily to the lack of recruits.

Chart 54



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(5) Logistics.

(a) Logistics performance will be measured by examining:

- 1 Supply Center Performance.
- 2 Transportation Performance.
- 3 Craft Availability.

(1) Supply Center Performance. VNN Supply Center performance data and standards established for RIMMS are listed in Table 5. Customer satisfaction is a measure of ability to fill requisitions from the center's load list. Demand accomodation measures the validity of the Supply center's load list. Rejection rate is the percent of requisitions which were incomplete or improperly submitted and therefore rejected. Taken together the indicators reveal that the Supply Center has a valid load list and is able to meet customer demands.


TABLE 5

SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS

<u>INDICATOR</u>	<u>DESIRED</u>	<u>SATISFACTORY</u>	<u>30 JUN 70</u>
Customer Satisfaction	70%	60%	68%
Stockage Satisfaction	85%	75%	87%
Demand Accomodation	90%	75%	78%
Requisition Rejection Rate	10%	15%	6%

Chart 55

LOGISTICS LIFT CRAFT RESULTS
TONS OF CARGO AND POL TRANSPORTED



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(c) Transportation Performance. The number of tons of cargo and PGM lifted by the logistics flotilla and the IWWF Improvement and Modernization Standard are shown on Chart 5. The desired standard is based on average capacities and a 70 percent utilization of craft. This was the first quarter that the logistic flotilla has met the desired standards during the six quarters shown. During past quarters, craft availability and employment have been high; however, inefficient scheduling and cargo handling have resulted in the standards not being met. The Joint General Staff (JGS) has relinquished control of most of the major logistic craft. The USN logistic flotilla commander notifies the JGS when a craft is available for a mission. JGS then schedules a cargo lift mission. This short notice practice, short loading, and no back-loading of cargo has resulted in inefficient utilization of assets. The 4th quarter improvement is due primarily to a sharp reduction in the amount of short loading.

(d) Craft Availability. Availability is a gross measure of USN ability in craft maintenance and supply of spare parts. The USN and USMC presently have a single logistic bill, and USN facilities are responsible for the support of USMC craft until the turnover of all repair facilities in FY 71. The indicator is, therefore, currently a measure of the combined effort to maintain IFFs, IFFs and KAL. Since the USN facilities maintain the older craft, the indicator is a truer measure of strictly USN capability, when consideration is given to the fact that some of these craft are 15 years old.

1. If a craft is capable of getting underway, it is considered available. The indicator does not measure the operability of armament, communication equipment, or auxiliary engineering equipment.

2. The availability of selected craft is shown in Chart 16.

1. IFF WLP availability exceeded the desired standard during the quarter. This is attributed to the effort to have craft available for the increased tempo of operations in South Vietnam.

1. IFF availability was good during the quarter. An average of 75 percent of the craft were available during the quarter, just 5 percent below the desired standard.

1. River assault craft (KAL, KAG and KID) were below the desired standard of availability during the quarter due primarily to maintenance problems of the older KAG craft, some of which are 15 years old.

1. Logistic lift craft continue to be above their desired standard of availability with 80 percent of the craft available during the quarter, 10 percent above the desired standard.

1. Operational Performance.


(1) Operational performance will be measured by examining:

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
Chart 5b

CRAFT AVAILABILITY


PCF/WPB & PBR



RIVER ASSUALT



LOGISTICS LIFT



--- DESIRED AVAILABILITY

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(a) Craft Employment.

(b) Performance Indicators.

(1) Craft Employment. Employment is a measure of the VNN level of activity. A craft is employed if it gets underway. A fleet command ship, however, is considered employed the entire time it is deployed from Saigon, even if it is in port. The indicator does not reveal whether or not the unit was gainfully employed. It must be used in conjunction with adviser reports and the performance indicators. Charts 17 and 18 show quarterly craft employment statistics for 1969 and first quarter 1970.

(a) The standards for employment were based, for older craft, upon past VNN performance, and for newer assets, such as PCF, PKB and PA, on past USN performance.

(b) Coastal Surveillance craft employment continues to be just below the desired standard. The major craft, PCF, and WPB, were 80 percent employed during the quarter; 10 percent above the desired standard. This resulted from increased operations to maintain the coastal barrier while also conducting increased patrols in the Gulf of Thailand during the Cambodian operations.

(c) River security craft employment continues to be above the desired standard with PKBs contributing their efforts to operations along the Tonle Sap, Tran Hung Dao, Huat Fling Chot and Rung Sat Special Area.

(d) River Assault Craft (RAI, RAID, RID) employment increased slightly over last quarter with a 7.5 percent quarterly average. Six RAIDs were employed in troop lifts for the Vietnamese Marine Corps during the Cambodian operations.

(e) Logistics lift craft employment was above the desired standard during the quarter. The performance of these craft was above the desired standard in all categories, i.e., tons of cargo lifted, availability and employment.


(2) Performance Indicators. The four indicators listed in Table 1 have been developed to give an indication of the performance and readiness of three major VNN operating groups. These indicators have been maintained (averaged over all craft in a specific group). Risk still remains, for example, one division of boats operating in a high risk area versus one in a low risk area. As a result the numbers have meaning only when compared to a standard. The standard values were computed from historical data obtained on USN units operating in the three major operating groups. An expanded data base is being compiled to give more meaningful standards considering present operations. All four indicators must be used together and subjected to a value judgment to obtain a relative picture of VNN performance and readiness. The data is taken from VNN operational summaries,

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
Chart 57

VIETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT EMPLOYMENT

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CRAFT



RIVER SECURITY CRAFT



--- ASSIGNED

■ EMPLOYED

► DESIRED EMPLOYMENT


◄ SATISFACTORY EMPLOYMENT

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
Chart 58

VIETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT EMPLOYMENT

RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT



LOGISTICS LIFT CRAFT



--- ASSIGNED

■ EMPLOYED

▷ DESIRED EMPLOYMENT

◁ SATISFACTORY EMPLOYMENT

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USN and advisor spot reports. Although these indicators were chosen as possible comparison measures they often have little meaning because the VNN craft in Market Time, for example, have had less than one percent of the opportunity to get in fire-fights that USN PCF in river operations have had. In operations such as Giant Slingshot, where VNN river patrol groups are integrated with USN river divisions, it is difficult to detect any differences in readiness and training of the two navies.

TABLE 6

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Indicator	Standard	Apr	May	Jun
<u>Coastal Divisions</u>				
Boats damaged/destr per Unit	.03	.0	.0	.0
Incidents per Unit	.04	.04	.0	.01
Friendly casualties per Unit	.1	.0	.0	.0
Enemy eliminated per Unit	.1	.06	.0	.0
<u>River Patrol Groups</u>				
Boats damaged/destr per Unit	.17	.0	.20	.0
Incidents per Unit	.01	.52	.26	.14
Friendly casualties per Unit	.1	.14	.38	.40
Enemy eliminated per Unit	.01	.32	.18	.06
<u>River Assault & Interdiction Divisions</u>				
Boats damaged/destr per Unit	.27	.15	.01	.0
Incidents per Unit	.17	.20	.14	.07
Friendly casualties per Unit	.27	.24	.09	.49
Enemy eliminated per Unit	.17	.06	.0	.0


1. Coastal Divisions. The VNN presently has three coastal divisions divided into six coastal squadrons deployed on Market Time patrols. The VNN controls one of the 12 coastal surveillance stations as indicated in Chart 10 on page 1. Market Time patrol operations are relatively quiet in comparison to Sea Lords interdiction operations. Inasmuch as only a few VNN PFCs are assigned to Sea Lords, the readiness and performance indicator shows a large disparity from the standard, which is based on all PFC operations. With the 21 PFCs turned over during the quarter, the VNN PFCs will be playing a larger part in Sea Lords operations and a more apt picture will be presented by the readiness and performance indicators.

2. River Patrol Groups. With the turnover of 167 PBRs during the quarter, the number of VNN River Patrol Groups (RPG) increased from four to twelve. Each RPG consists of 10 craft, with the exception of RPG 1 which has 13 craft. The Patrol Groups are tasked with maintaining the security of the waterways primarily in MR 3 and 4. RPG 1, with its seven craft, serves as an escort group on the Delta waterways.

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Chart 59

MARKET TIME SURVEILLANCE STATIONS




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Chart 60

MARKET TIME SURVEILLANCE STATIONS



74

[illegible]

1. $\frac{1}{2}$ 2. $\frac{1}{2}$ 3. $\frac{1}{2}$ 4. $\frac{1}{2}$ 5. $\frac{1}{2}$ 6. $\frac{1}{2}$ 7. $\frac{1}{2}$ 8. $\frac{1}{2}$ 9. $\frac{1}{2}$ 10. $\frac{1}{2}$

2. At the start of the last time period (1980 and 1981) the barrier was 100% impermeable to sperm. By the end of the time period (1982) it was 100% permeable to sperm and did not have a significant effect on the fertility index.


[illegible]

On 12/15/77, the FBI advised that the FBI reported in June 1976 that the FBI had been contacted by a person in Mexico, primarily in the United States, who had the FBI. The person, a person who was not in the FBI, had the FBI.

[illegible]

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Chart 61



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1940


1. Industrial Revolution. Population growth stimulated by the new
technology of the 18th century. The population of the world was
increasing rapidly, and the demand for food and other goods was
increasing. The industrial revolution was a period of rapid
growth in the production of goods and services. It was a
period of great change, and it was a period of great
achievement. The industrial revolution was a period of
great change, and it was a period of great achievement.

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
Chart 62

VIETNAMESE NAVY RESULTS


ENEMY-VNN CRAFT CAPTURED, DESTROYED, AND DAMAGED



ENEMY ELIM-VNN KIA



COASTAL CRAFT SEARCHED



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2000 年 12 月 20 日

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ANNEX A

Enemy Contacts

Results per battalion in terms of number and hours of contact are shown in this annex for each major organization. Results are shown for total contacts, platoon, company and battalion size contacts, and contacts by day and night.

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ALL MISSIONS ALL OPERATIONS		CONTACTS										2ND QTR 70			
		* - - - - COMPANY CONTACTS - - *										* - - - - BATTALION CONTACTS - - *			
		BN		STBN		RN		STBN		AV		BN		STBN	
		NU.	AV	HRS	AV	HRS	AV	HRS	AV	NO.	AV	NO.	AV	HRS	AV
01 DIV		53	3.1	3.7	88	5.2	6.2	1.66		55	3.2	3.9	196	11.5	13.8
02 DIV		61	5.1	7.6	211	17.6	26.4	3.46		12	1.0	1.5	46	3.8	5.8
51 REG		18	4.5	4.5	18	4.5	4.5	1.00		03	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.00
I CTZ		13	4.0	5.0	317	9.6	12.1	2.40		67	2.0	2.6	242	7.3	9.2
22 DIV		34	2.8	3.6	44	3.7	4.6	1.29		06	0.5	0.6	27	2.2	2.8
23 DIV		37	3.1	3.9	47	3.9	4.9	1.27		06	0.5	0.6	34	2.8	3.6
42 REG		14	3.5	4.6	20	5.0	6.6	1.43		146	36.5	48.1	73	18.3	24.1
II CTZ		85	3.0	3.8	111	4.0	5.0	1.31		158	5.6	7.1	134	4.8	6.1
05 DIV		05	0.7	0.9	07	0.6	0.7	0.78		04	0.3	0.4	09	0.7	0.9
18 DIV		31	2.6	2.8	51	4.2	4.7	1.65		22	1.8	2.0	67	5.6	6.1
25 DIV		18	1.5	1.7	41	3.4	3.8	2.28		10	0.8	0.9	34	2.8	3.2
III CTZ		59	1.6	1.8	99	2.7	3.1	1.71		36	1.0	1.1	110	3.1	3.4
07 DIV		23	1.9	2.8	40	3.3	4.9	1.74		30	2.5	3.6	138	11.5	16.7
09 DIV		42	3.5	5.1	125	10.4	15.3	2.98		21	1.7	2.6	73	6.1	8.9
21 DIV		15	1.2	2.0	59	4.9	7.9	3.93		19	1.6	2.6	73	6.1	9.8
IV CTZ		90	2.2	3.4	224	6.2	9.4	2.80		70	1.9	2.9	284	7.9	11.9
INF TOTALS		355	2.7	3.4	751	5.6	7.2	2.12		331	2.5	3.2	770	5.8	7.4
CV 1 CTZ		07	1.9	1.5	17	4.3	3.7	2.43		01	0.3	0.2	07	1.8	1.5
CV 2 CTZ		02	0.7	0.6	02	0.7	0.6	1.00		00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.00
CV 3 CTZ		28	5.6	5.5	121	24.2	23.6	4.32		24	4.8	4.7	199	39.8	38.8
CV 4 CTZ		49	9.8	9.0	183	36.6	33.6	3.73		32	6.4	5.9	159	31.8	29.2
CV TOTALS		86	5.1	4.7	323	19.0	17.7	3.76		57	3.7	3.1	365	21.5	20.0
RN 1 CTZ		05	1.7	1.8	08	2.7	2.9	1.60		00	0.0	0.0	00	0.0	0.00
RN 2 CTZ		20	6.7	8.3	25	8.3	10.4	1.25		34	11.3	14.1	76	25.3	31.6
RN 3 CTZ		18	2.0	2.3	50	10.0	11.7	5.00		17	1.4	1.7	64	7.1	8.3
RN 4 CTZ		22	4.4	5.5	43	8.6	11.6	1.95		02	0.4	0.5	19	3.8	5.1
RN TOTALS		65	3.3	3.9	166	9.3	10.0	2.55		49	2.5	2.9	159	9.0	9.6
AB DIV		93	10.3	11.7	184	20.4	23.2	1.98		20	2.2	2.5	283	31.4	35.6
VNMC		31	4.0	3.9	77	10.0	9.6	2.48		24	3.1	3.0	224	29.2	28.0
SPEC UNITS		275	5.1	5.4	750	14.0	14.8	2.73		150	2.8	3.0	1031	19.2	20.3
APVN/VNMC		63	3.4	4.1	1501	8.0	9.7	2.38		481	2.6	3.1	1801	9.6	11.6

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ALL MISSIONS ALL OPERATIONS		CONTACTS										2ND QTR 70	
		ALL DAY CONTACTS					ALL NIGHT CONTACTS						
		NO.	AV	STRN	HRS	AV	NO.	AV	STRN	HRS	AV	STRN	AVR
													DUP
01 DIV		319	19.8	22.4	77	27.8	64	3.7	4.4	105	6.2	7.4	1.67
02 DIV		217	12.1	27.2	71	30.9	166	13.8	20.8	156	13.0	19.4	0.94
51 REG		66	16.5	16.4	47	11.8	28	7.0	6.9	17	4.3	4.2	0.51
I CTZ		602	15.2	22.5	491	27.0	257	7.8	9.8	278	8.4	10.6	1.08
22 DIV		109	9.1	11.4	122	10.2	44	3.7	4.6	46	3.8	4.8	1.05
23 DIV		102	8.5	10.7	105	8.6	34	3.0	3.8	49	4.1	5.1	1.36
42 REG		137	34.2	45.1	76	19.0	48	12.0	15.8	41	10.2	13.5	0.85
II CTZ		349	12.4	15.7	501	10.7	124	4.6	5.8	136	4.9	6.1	1.06
05 DIV		132	11.0	12.5	128	10.7	53	4.4	5.0	36	3.0	3.4	0.68
18 DIV		112	9.3	10.3	154	12.8	16	1.3	1.5	25	2.2	2.4	1.63
25 DIV		145	12.1	13.5	226	12.8	59	4.9	5.5	55	4.6	5.1	0.93
III CTZ		385	10.8	12.1	508	14.1	129	3.6	4.0	117	3.2	3.6	0.91
07 DIV		192	16.0	23.2	240	20.0	109	9.1	13.2	172	14.3	20.9	1.58
09 DIV		163	13.6	20.0	335	27.9	33	2.7	4.0	58	4.8	7.1	1.76
21 DIV		103	8.6	13.8	186	15.5	23	2.4	3.9	56	4.7	7.5	1.93
IV CTZ		458	12.7	19.2	761	21.1	171	4.7	7.2	286	7.9	12.0	1.67
INF TOTALS		1797	13.5	17.2	2461	18.5	684	5.1	6.5	817	6.1	7.8	1.19
CV 1 CTZ		23	5.8	5.1	36	9.0	11	2.8	2.4	13	3.3	2.9	1.18
CV 2 CTZ		28	9.3	9.0	15	5.0	09	2.7	2.6	06	2.0	1.9	0.75
CV 3 CTZ		121	24.2	23.6	432	26.4	17	3.4	3.3	42	8.4	8.2	2.47
CV 4 CTZ		100	20.0	18.3	362	72.4	27	5.4	5.0	27	5.4	5.0	1.00
CV TOTALS		272	16.0	14.0	945	49.7	63	3.7	3.5	88	5.2	4.8	1.40
RN 1 CTZ		74	24.7	20.6	45	15.0	15	5.3	5.8	75	1.7	1.8	0.31
RN 2 CTZ		74	24.7	30.7	69	23.0	22	7.3	9.1	57	19.0	23.7	2.59
RN 3 CTZ		63	7.0	8.2	185	20.6	29	3.2	3.8	39	4.3	5.1	1.34
RN 4 CTZ		72	14.4	15.4	157	21.4	14	2.3	3.8	27	5.4	7.3	1.93
RN TOTALS		283	14.2	17.0	456	22.8	81	4.1	4.9	129	6.4	7.7	1.58
AB DIV		305	33.9	38.4	620	68.9	103	11.4	13.0	249	27.7	31.3	2.42
VNMC		101	13.2	12.6	275	35.0	25	4.6	4.4	100	13.0	12.5	2.86
SPEC UNITS		961	17.9	18.9	2196	40.9	262	5.3	5.5	565	10.5	11.1	2.00
ARVN/VNMC		2758	14.8	17.5	4657	24.9	664	5.2	6.2	1382	7.4	8.9	1.43

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ANNEX B

Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results

Shown in this annex by division and separate regiment are the numbers of enemy initiated incidents by type, whether day or night, and the resulting number of friendly KIA, WIA, MIA or captured; enemy eliminated; and weapons captured or lost.

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	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN ELIM		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT	
1ST DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	12	0	10	0	4	0	0	0	0	12
TERR/SABO/HARS	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	19	2	0	0	22	1	33	0	0	0
2ND DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	78	0	0	0	24	0	121	0	0	6
51ST REGT										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	9	0	0	0	11	0	19	0	0	0

	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN ELIM		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT	
22ND DIV										
ASSAULT	1	1	4	47	0	6	32	0	2	11
AMBUSH	2	0	0	0	19	0	10	0	18	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	17	13	0	0	3	1	17	0	2	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	17	3	0	0	14	2	36	0	0	2
23RD DIV										
ASSAULT	10	1	2	17	3	10	50	0	0	3
AMBUSH	3	0	0	0	2	0	6	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	13	13	0	0	0	3	19	0	0	3
TERR/SABO/HARS	5	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	3	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	0
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SABO/HARS										
MINE/BOOBY TRAP										

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	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN ELIM		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT	
5TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	2	0	21	0	1	13	0	0	4
AMBUSH	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	5	11	0	0	0	4	33	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	51	4	1	1	17	2	116	0	0	0
18TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
25TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	63	2	0	0	9	1	99	0	0	0

	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN ELIM		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT	
7TH DIV										
ASSAULT	1	4	8	29	8	14	29	2	0	17
AMBUSH	31	19	4	0	8	0	42	0	1	27
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	8	0	0	0	4	17	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	90	1	0	0	14	3	265	4	0	0
9TH DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	180	0	10	0	23	32	310	0	0	0
21ST DIV										
ASSAULT	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	40	1	0	0	14	0	54	0	0	0

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	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		EN ELIM		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT	
AIRBORNE										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	4	1	0	0	1	1	13	0	0	0
CAVALRY										
ASSAULT	0	3	0	61	0	2	14	0	0	24
AMBUSH	14	0	30	0	3	0	7	0	0	20
ATTACK BY FIRE	27	21	0	0	4	1	27	0	1	2
TERR/SABO/HARS	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	71	3	8	0	19	0	202	0	0	5
RANGERS										
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	2	2	4	0	2	3	7	0	1	2
ATTACK BY FIRE	4	3	3	0	1	0	7	0	0	0
TERR/SABO/HARS	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	86	7	0	0	20	6	175	0	0	0

	ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID		FN ELIM		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
	DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT	LOST	CAPT	
MARINES										
ASSAULT	0	1	0	12	0	0	15	0	0	5
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	8	0	3	1	0	5	0	0	2
TERR/SABO/HARS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MINE/BOOBY TRAP	95	13	9	1	9	2	160	0	0	0
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SABO/HARS										
MINE/BOOBY TRAP										
ASSAULT										
AMBUSH										
ATTACK BY FIRE										
TERR/SABO/HARS										
MINE/BOOBY TRAP										

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ANNEX C

Effort, Results and Caches Discovered

1. Distribution of effort as shown in this annex is the percent of time spent on the different types of operations by divisions and separate battalions. Distribution of effort is based on the actual number of battalion days spent on each type of operation, against the number of battalion days available. The following definitions apply to the operations as used in this annex:

a. Combat Operations. Offensive actions where the primary mission is to locate and neutralize VC/NVA main force units, their equipment, base areas, and lines of communication.

b. Operations in Support of Pacification. Operations conducted in or adjacent to areas in which pacification is in progress.

(1) Pacification Active. Offensive operations which have the purpose of protecting pacification areas by neutralizing enemy district, provincial, local, and/or guerrilla forces and enemy infrastructure. This can include reconnaissance in force, direct attacks against located enemy forces, cordon and search operations, long range-patrols, and ambushes.

(2) Pacification Static. Defensive operations which have the purpose of denying enemy access to pacification areas. This includes outposts, patrols, and strong points within the immediate vicinity of the protected area, and security and reserve missions which are in support of pacification.

c. Rehabilitation. Time spent restoring a unit's physical and mental strength with rest and resupply.

d. Reserve (Other than support of pacification). Maneuver units, including alerted but not committed reaction forces, are in reserve when so designated by the appropriate commander and not otherwise employed.

e. Security Operations (Other than Support of Pacification). Operations conducted to protect the population, military, and political and economic resources and installations.

f. Training. Those missions in which forces are involved in training.

2. Pages C-2 to C-18 contain tabulations for distribution of effort (combat, security, pacification active, pacification static, reserve, training and rehabilitation), friendly KIA and enemy eliminated, captured or surrendered, weapons captured versus lost, and caches, as reported by all ARVN/VNMC organizations. Page C-18 contains tabulations for distribution of effort for the 1st Qtr CY 70 and the 2d Qtr CY 70 by major ARVN/VNMC organization.

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1 CCRPS 02 INFANTRY DIVISION

EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES					
UNITS	PCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	EN ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTC SURR	WEAPONS CPTC LCST	WEAPONS	FCCD LBS	100 LBS AMPC	
INF REGT RATINGS													
04 REGT	46.15	27.47	21.70	2.75	627	28	22.4/1	76	8	175	34	48E	27
05 REGT	42.86	20.05	7.14	10.16	472	12	3.0/1	39	15	115	6	16	7
06 REGT	45.33	16.76	26.37	4.40	592	56	10.6/1	67	15	130	18	20	2
INF BN RATINGS													
001 BN 04 REGT	40.66	25.67	26.37	3.30	120	10	12.0/1	13	2	28	0	220	1
002 BN 04 REGT	52.75	15.78	13.15	6.55	105	8	15.0/1	19	3	23	6	120	15
003 BN 04 REGT	46.15	22.67	20.88	.00	206	4	51.5/1	25	2	50	26	81	8
004 BN 04 REGT	45.05	37.47	26.37	1.10	196	6	52.7/1	15	1	74	2	67	3
001 BN 05 REGT	48.35	34.07	.00	17.58	142	35	4.1/1	2	0	44	3	0	0
002 BN 05 REGT	36.26	.00	.00	6.55	82	32	1.1/1	12	0	18	0	0	0
003 BN 05 REGT	41.76	18.68	25.27	.00	177	30	5.9/1	23	15	30	3	11	5
004 BN 05 REGT	45.05	27.47	3.30	16.48	71	15	4.7/1	2	0	27	0	5	2
001 BN 06 REGT	43.56	20.88	28.57	.00	88	4	22.0/1	1	0	16	0	4	2
002 BN 06 REGT	25.27	10.59	41.76	16.48	189	14	13.5/1	49	15	41	0	0	0
003 BN 06 REGT	58.24	14.25	10.55	.00	109	15	5.7/1	2	4	15	0	16	0
004 BN 06 REGT	53.85	20.88	24.18	1.10	206	15	10.8/1	15	0	58	18	0	0
AVERAGE	44.78	21.42	18.40	5.76	140.9	46.3	7.0/1	15.1	3.5	35.3	4.8	43.6	3.0

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1 CORPS 51 INFANTRY REGIMENT											
EFFORT						RESULTS				CACHES	
UNITS	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	EN	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY	WEAPONS	LCST	FOOD
	CBT OPS	SECURITY	PAC ACTIVE	PAC STATIC	ELIM						
INF REGT RATINGS											
51 REGT	59.89	21.98	14.84	.00	386	67	5.6/1	24	1	80	3
INF BN RATINGS											
001 BN 51 REGT	57.14	17.58	12.09	.00	108	24	6.7/1	0	1	25	2
002 BN 51 REGT	59.34	25.67	10.99	.00	145	13	11.2/1	19	0	43	1
003 BN 51 REGT	57.14	26.37	16.48	.00	44	2	22.0/1	0	0	4	3
004 BN 51 REGT	65.93	14.29	15.78	.00	29	28	1.0/1	5	0	8	8
AVERAGE	59.89	21.97	14.83	.00	96.5	16.7	5.6/1	6.0	.2	20.0	.7
										35.2	.7
											3.2

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2 CORPS 22 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS						CACHES			
	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	EN ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY		WEAPONS		CACHES			
							CPTC	SURR	CPTC	LCST	WEAPONS	FCCD	LCG LES LBS AMMO	
INF REGT RATINGS														
40 REGT	3.02	.00	21.70	138	31	4.5/1	14	7	47	C	786	3304	1463	
41 REGT	2.85	36.54	16.21	251	57	4.4/1	5	C	64	2C	C	36	25	
47 REGT	45.45	8.24	.00	12	25	0.5/1	5	C	7	1	152	620	108	
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 40 REGT	5.45	.00	8.79	41	14	2.9/1	1	0	25	C	C	900	3	
002 BN 40 REGT	2.20	.00	23.08	30	6	5.0/1	6	C	7	0	170	354	40	
003 BN 40 REGT	2.20	.00	16.48	21	7	5.0/1	4	C	5	C	218	555	900	
004 BN 40 REGT	2.20	.00	38.46	46	4	11.5/1	3	7	10	C	258	1021	520	
001 BN 41 REGT	7.65	15.78	.00	24	25	1.0/1	0	0	16	18	0	4	23	
002 BN 41 REGT	7.65	8.75	.10	28	8	5.5/1	3	0	5	5	C	3		
003 BN 41 REGT	.00	71.43	13.15	178	18	9.9/1	1	C	25	5	0	31	1	
004 BN 41 REGT	.00	46.15	50.35	21	6	5.5/1	1	0	10	2	C	C		
001 BN 47 REGT	52.75	.00	.00	3	4	0.8/1	C	0	3	C	C	20	10	
002 BN 47 REGT	38.46	32.57	.00	8	13	0.6/1	5	C	3	C	152	600	158	
003 BN 47 REGT	50.55	.00	.00	0	1	0.0/1	0	C	C	C	C	C	C	
004 BN 47 REGT	56.04	.00	.00	1	7	0.1/1	C	0	1	1	C	C	C	
AVERAGE	15.77	14.52	12.63	33.4	9.4	-3.5/1	2.0	.5	9.8	2.5	78.1	330.1	138.0	

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2 CORPS 23 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS					CACHES				
	PCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	IN HIN	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTC SUPP	WEAPONS CPTC LCST	WEAPONS			
										WEAPONS	100 LBS	AMMC	
INF REGT RATINGS													
44 REGT	43.12	20.05	.82	19.23	135	13	10.2/1	21	C	C	117	C	
45 REGT	37.91	12.74	15.93	9.07	50	40	1.2/1	C	C	1	277	4	
53 REGT	35.44	21.87	20.33	1.10	2	29	0.0/1	4	C	7	4	2	
INF BN RATINGS													
001 BN 44 REGT	49.45	35.16	.CC	.CC	20	3	8.7/1	8	C	C	33	4	
002 BN 44 REGT	38.46	28.57	.CC	.CC	14	4	3.5/1	5	C	C	C	C	
003 BN 44 REGT	65.23	15.38	.CC	.CC	65	5	13.0/1	C	C	0	84	C	
004 BN 44 REGT	15.38	1.10	3.30	76.92	28	1	28.0/1	8	C	10	C	C	
001 BN 45 REGT	36.26	.CC	45.45	.CC	33	15	1.2/1	C	C	C	7	C	
002 BN 45 REGT	24.18	2.20	.CC	36.26	32	4	8.0/1	C	C	1	200	C	
003 BN 45 REGT	37.26	47.25	.CC	.CC	1	6	0.2/1	C	C	C	70	C	
004 BN 45 REGT	53.85	5.45	14.25	.CC	0	17	0.0/1	C	C	0	C	C	
001 BN 53 REGT	59.34	13.15	7.65	4.40	16	8	2.0/1	2	C	14	1	C	
002 BN 53 REGT	8.75	.CC	73.63	.CC	2	5	0.4/1	C	C	C	4	C	
003 BN 53 REGT	31.87	55.24	.CC	.CC	5	12	0.4/1	C	C	1	C	C	
004 BN 53 REGT	41.76	54.55	.CC	.CC	4	3	1.3/1	2	C	17	0	C	
AVERAGE	38.82	21.83	12.36	9.75	18.0	7.3	2.5/1	2.0	.C	5.1	.3	.5	
										.6	33.1	.5	

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2 CCRPS 42 INFANTRY REGIMENT

UNITS	EFFECT				RESULTS				CACHES					
	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME STATIC	EN ILLIN	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTC SURR	WEAPONS CPTC LCST	WEAPONS FCCD	LBS AMMC	LBS FCCD	LBS AMMC	
INF REGT RATINGS														
42 REGT	47.22	41.21	.00	.00	954	125	3.2/1	0	0	41	151	16	0	2
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 42 REGT	47.03	25.27	.00	.00	372	36	6.3/1	0	0	18	140	0	0	0
002 BN 42 REGT	50.55	47.25	.00	.00	61	21	2.9/1	0	0	10	0	0	0	2
003 BN 42 REGT	39.56	32.57	.00	.00	336	43	3.2/1	0	0	12	50	0	0	0
004 BN 42 REGT	32.97	55.34	.00	.00	185	25	6.6/1	0	0	1	1	16	0	0
AVERAGE	47.52	41.20	.00	.00	238.5	31.2	3.32/1	.0	.0	10.2	47.7	4.0	.0	.5

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CORPS 05 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES						
	PCT TIME CPT CPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	EN ILLIN	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY	WEAPENS	CPTC SURR	CPTC LCST	WEAPONS	FCCD	100 LBS AMMO	
INF REGT RATINGS															
07 REGT	77.47	16.76	.CC	.CC	94	25	3.8/1	21	1	54	C	48	14	14	
08 REGT	72.80	22.80	.CC	.CC	81	16	5.1/1	8	5	36	C	94	27	173	
09 REGT	91.76	6.64	.CC	.CC	100	37	2.9/1	?	C	43	C	296	1263	220	
INF BN RATINGS															
001 BN 07 REGT	55.60	.CC	.CC	.CC	9	2	4.5/1	3	C	7	C	10	2	0	
002 BN 07 REGT	30.77	61.54	.CC	.CC	10	3	3.3/1	3	C	6	C	0	2	1	
003 BN 07 REGT	90.11	3.30	.CC	.CC	40	7	5.7/1	10	C	13	C	1	C	0	
004 BN 07 REGT	93.41	2.20	.CC	.CC	55	13	2.7/1	5	1	28	C	37	10	13	
001 BN 08 REGT	35.16	62.64	.CC	.CC	11	6	1.8/1	2	1	1	0	0	C	C	
002 BN 08 REGT	91.21	4.40	.CC	.CC	51	3	17.0/1	2	4	27	0	70	26	166	
003 BN 08 REGT	75.82	17.58	.CC	.CC	14	5	2.8/1	3	C	6	C	0	0	0	
004 BN 08 REGT	89.01	6.55	.CC	.CC	5	2	2.5/1	1	C	2	C	24	1	7	
001 BN 09 REGT	100.00	.CC	.CC	.CC	32	4	8.0/1	3	C	16	C	6	113	1	
002 BN 09 REGT	91.21	3.30	.CC	.CC	28	14	2.0/1	1	C	8	C	213	30	210	
003 BN 09 REGT	81.22	18.68	.CC	.CC	24	6	3.0/1	0	0	11	C	36	500	7	
004 BN 09 REGT	94.51	2.20	.CC	.CC	22	11	2.0/1	3	C	8	C	41	620	2	
AVERAGE	80.67	15.20	.CC	.CC	25.4	6.5	3.6/1	3.0	.5	11.0	.C	36.5	108.6	33.5	

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CCRP 1A INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT				ILLUM	RESULTS			CACHES					
	PCT TIME C-TOPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC		FRIENDLY KIA	CAN RATIO	ENEMY	WEAPONS					
									CPTC	SURR	CPTC	LCST	WEAPONS	FCCD
INF REGT RATINGS														
43 REGT	83.79	5.22	.CC	.CC	103	15	0.9/1	4	2	37	5	1	257	6
49 REGT	80.22	12.91	.CC	.CC	17	12	14.5/1	20	1	35	1	24	51	6
52 REGT	79.95	1.65	.CC	.CC	401	27	15.0/1	58	1	55	0	5	31	15
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 43 REGT	92.42	7.69	.CC	.CC	10	9	1.8/1	0	0	3	5	0	250	3
002 BN 43 REGT	100.00	.CC	.CC	.CC	9	5	1.8/1	0	0	7	0	0	4	2
003 BN 43 REGT	87.51	.CC	.CC	.CC	57	1	57.0/1	3	2	21	0	0	1	1
004 BN 43 REGT	94.84	13.19	.CC	.CC	21	0	21.0/1	1	0	6	0	1	2	0
001 BN 48 REGT	83.52	6.59	.CC	.CC	47	1	47.0/1	1	0	5	0	0	0	0
002 BN 48 REGT	90.22	7.69	.CC	.CC	22	4	5.5/1	1	0	7	1	0	0	0
003 BN 48 REGT	79.12	20.88	.CC	.CC	24	3	8.0/1	0	0	4	0	24	0	0
004 BN 48 REGT	78.02	16.48	.CC	.CC	0	4	19.8/1	18	1	19	0	0	51	6
001 BN 52 REGT	94.51	.CC	.CC	.CC	74	8	9.3/1	11	0	2	0	0	30	3
002 BN 52 REGT	70.31	.CC	.CC	.CC	28	7	4.0/1	1	0	7	0	0	0	2
003 BN 52 REGT	71.43	6.59	.CC	.CC	292	12	24.5/1	45	1	41	0	5	0	10
004 BN 52 REGT	83.52	.CC	.CC	.CC	10	0	10.0/1	1	0	5	0	0	1	0
AVERAGE	91.31	6.59	.CC	.CC	56.6	4.5	12.6/1	6.8	.3	10.5	.5	2.8	26.2	2.2

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3 CORPS 25 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFECT				RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME ACTIVE	PCT TIME STATIC	ENEMY KIA	ENEMY CAPTURED	ENEMY WEAPONS	ENEMY WEAPONS	ENEMY WEAPONS	ENEMY WEAPONS	ENEMY WEAPONS	ENEMY WEAPONS
46 REGT	72.60	5.77	21.43	.00	42	157	10	184	3	246	C	224
49 REGT	56.70	.45	.00	.00	35	109	3	228	C	401	176	358
50 REGT	16.70	4.67	71.58	3.57	43	32	5	77	6	23	2000	110
INF BN RATINGS												
001 BN 46 REGT	87.91	12.09	.00	.00	24	49	0	49	3	244	C	220
002 BN 46 REGT	14.29	.00	85.71	.00	3	20	2	20	C	2	C	4
003 BN 46 REGT	95.60	4.40	.00	.00	6	84	6	84	C	C	C	C
004 BN 46 REGT	93.41	6.59	.00	.00	15	35	2	31	C	0	C	C
001 BN 49 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	11	8	0	30	C	4	1	1
002 BN 49 REGT	94.51	.00	.00	.00	5	38	1	56	C	328	68	52
003 BN 49 REGT	95.60	.00	.00	.00	8	42	2	94	C	62	100	300
004 BN 49 REGT	96.70	2.30	.00	.00	11	21	C	48	0	7	7	5
001 BN 50 REGT	60.00	.00	84.62	13.19	2	3	3	3	C	2	C	5
002 BN 50 REGT	67.03	6.59	28.37	.00	26	18	0	41	6	21	2000	105
003 BN 50 REGT	.00	12.09	85.71	1.10	5	8	2	11	C	0	C	C
004 BN 50 REGT	.00	.00	91.21	.00	6	3	4	22	C	0	C	C
AVERAGE	62.08	3.66	31.13	1.19	10.5	24.8	1.8	40.7	.7	55.8	181.3	57.6

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4 COWPS 07 INFANTRY DIVISION

EFFECT				RESULTS				CACHES				
UNITS	PCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	EN ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	EN RATIO	ENEMY	WEAPONS	CPTC LCST	WEAPONS	ICC LBS AMMC
INF REGT RATINGS												
10 REGT	67.19	23.63	4.55	.00	300	71	5.0	96	0	3	124	31
11 REGT	57.69	6.04	1.92	.00	103	30	1.0	45	1	55	27	1
12 REGT	64.12	22.25	.00	.00	149	45	5.0	12	0	0	66	4
INF BN RATINGS												
001 BN 10 REGT	72.03	20.69	.00	.00	09	13	7.0	13	0	0	0	0
002 BN 10 REGT	52.76	25.27	17.58	.00	74	19	3.0	6	0	1	0	1
003 BN 10 REGT	70.13	13.15	2.20	.00	73	16	4.0	25	0	0	0	0
004 BN 10 REGT	57.14	35.16	.00	.00	120	22	5.0	52	0	2	132	30
001 BN 11 REGT	41.76	.00	.00	.00	30	16	1.0	14	0	0	0	0
002 BN 11 REGT	51.75	20.69	.00	.00	62	37	1.5	6	6	22	0	1
003 BN 11 REGT	64.24	3.20	7.65	.00	45	11	2.0	14	5	1	0	0
004 BN 11 REGT	71.43	1.10	.00	.00	43	16	1.0	11	1	35	1	0
001 BN 12 REGT	39.56	2.00	.00	.00	20	13	1.5	1	0	0	0	0
002 BN 12 REGT	69.23	30.77	.00	.00	104	2	5.0	4	0	0	22	0
003 BN 12 REGT	57.86	41.76	.00	.00	95	19	1.0	4	0	0	44	4
004 BN 12 REGT	51.85	14.25	.00	.00	40	11	3.0	3	0	0	0	0
AVERAGE	59.23	17.30	2.28	.00	61.8	16.3	3.9	12.7	0	2.2	18.5	3.0

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CORPS CG INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT OPS	PCT TIME	PCT SECURITY	PCT TIME	PCT TIME	FRIENDLY KIA	ENEMY CPIC SUPP	WEAPONS CPTC LCST	WEAPONS	FUCD	LCC	LCC
14 REGT	64.64	3.57	.CC	.CC	1.65	75	9.2/1	4	288	18	2173	521
15 REGT	45.88	2.20	.CC	.CC	.95	59	12.8/1	5	50	0	389	129
16 REGT	70.60	8.52	.82	.82	.00	101	6.1/1	3	67	C	1833	C
INF REGT RATINGS												
001 BN 14 REGT	70.23	4.40	.CC	.CC	.00	24	12.2/1	34	84	C	580	2
002 BN 14 REGT	65.52	4.40	.CC	.CC	.00	25	5.9/1	31	86	S	111	517
003 BN 14 REGT	63.74	1.10	.CC	.CC	.00	12	10.4/1	10	85	C	1082	2
004 BN 14 REGT	59.34	4.40	.CC	.CC	.00	10	2.9/1	0	29	S	0	C
001 BN 15 REGT	50.55	1.10	.CC	.CC	.00	14	2.2/1	26	16	C	160	45
002 BN 15 REGT	53.85	1.10	.CC	.CC	.00	39	8.3/1	5	18	C	176	75
003 BN 15 REGT	23.08	1.10	.CC	.CC	.00	2	10.0/1	0	4	C	0	C
004 BN 15 REGT	56.04	5.65	.CC	.CC	.00	4	23.3/1	2	12	C	53	5
001 BN 16 REGT	83.52	.CC	.CC	.CC	.00	18	12.0/1	59	14	C	900	C
002 BN 16 REGT	72.53	.CC	.CC	.CC	.00	16	4.1/1	3	23	C	2	C
003 BN 16 REGT	42.86	34.07	.CC	.CC	.00	11	6.5/1	7	8	C	0	C
004 BN 16 REGT	83.52	.CC	.CC	.CC	.00	56	4.7/1	63	22	C	531	C
AVERAGE	60.43	5.12	4.48	.73	.73	171.8	8.8/1	20.0	33.7	1.5	366.2	54.1
												47.4

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4 CORPS 21 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES					
	PCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	IN ILIN	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY		WEAPONS		FOOD		
								CPTC	SURR	CPTC	LGST	WEAPONS	FOOD	
INF REGT RATINGS														
31 REGT	49.73	4.95	25.27	.00	368	52	7.1/1	18	C	89	15	9	1	11
32 REGT	53.57	1.37	23.06	.00	327	28	11.7/1	0	0	58	C	6	5	6
33 REGT	48.08	5.22	21.70	.55	127	34	3.6/1	10	1	45	8	13	C	11
INF BN RATINGS														
001 BN 31 REGT	81.32	.00	.00	.00	141	19	7.4/1	7	0	26	10	0	C	4
002 BN 31 REGT	.00	.00	100.00	.00	4	1	4.0/1	0	0	2	C	0	C	0
003 BN 31 REGT	61.54	1.10	.00	.00	109	12	9.1/1	4	C	20	C	0	1	5
004 BN 31 REGT	56.04	18.68	1.10	.00	114	20	5.7/1	7	C	41	5	9	C	2
001 BN 32 REGT	62.64	3.30	.00	.00	140	7	20.0/1	0	C	20	C	0	C	4
002 BN 32 REGT	17.58	.00	74.73	.00	69	13	5.3/1	0	0	6	C	0	C	0
003 BN 32 REGT	65.93	1.10	17.58	.00	43	4	10.8/1	C	C	12	C	6	C	C
004 BN 32 REGT	68.13	1.10	.00	.00	75	4	18.8/1	0	C	20	C	0	C	5
001 BN 33 REGT	79.12	.00	.00	.00	33	2	16.5/1	3	1	7	0	C	C	2
002 BN 33 REGT	.00	8.79	82.42	.00	14	7	2.0/1	4	C	14	0	0	C	0
003 BN 33 REGT	80.22	3.30	4.40	2.20	49	9	5.4/1	1	C	19	C	13	C	10
004 BN 33 REGT	22.97	8.79	.00	.00	31	16	1.8/1	2	0	5	8	0	C	1
AVERAGE	50.45	3.84	23.35	.18	68.5	9.5	7.1/1	2.3	.C	16.0	1.9	2.3	.5	2.3

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AIRBORNE DIVISION

UNITS	EFFECT				RESULTS			CACHES			
	PCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	IN TIME	FATHENLY KIA	ENEMY CPTC SUHR	WEAPONS CPTC LCST	WEAPONS	FCCD	LBS AMMO
001 ABN	BN	51.65	.CC	.CC	55	25	1.3	1	26	71	120
002 ABN	BN	97.60	.CC	.CC	55	35	1.0	1	41	32	120
003 ABN	BN	100.00	.CC	.CC	55	35	1.4	1	26	352	50
005 ABN	BN	47.25	.CC	.CC	107	9	10.7	17	23	80	140
006 ABN	BN	84.62	.CC	.CC	103	13	7.9	5	43	402	148
007 ABN	BN	90.01	.CC	.CC	51	7	7.4	8	28	0	4
008 ABN	BN	17.58	.CC	.CC	51	7	0.1	0	1	15	150
009 ABN	BN	78.02	.CC	.CC	139	15	7.5	0	43	41	22
011 ABN	BN	93.41	.CC	.CC	75	36	1.7	4	51	0	1000
AVERAGE		73.26	10.58	.CC	72.4	23.6	4.1	.7	31.3	114.7	211.1
				.CC				.1			194.6

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ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

UNITS	EFFECT				RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT TIME CMT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURP	WEAPONS CPTD LCST	WEAPONS FOOD	ICO LBS	ICO LBS AMPC
C01 CAV SCDN	95.71	3.30	.CC	.CC	.CC	3	4.5/1	1	20	12	80	51
C02 CAV SCDN	74.73	.CC	.CC	.CC	.CC	15	29.0/1	42	116	512	1	550
C03 CAV SCDN	27.47	35.56	.CC	.CC	.CC	3	19.3/1	4	8	0	10	0
C04 CAV SCDN	24.07	25.27	.CC	.CC	.CC	2	9.0/1	1	0	0	0	0
C05 CAV SCDN	64.84	2.20	.CC	.CC	.CC	7	66.9/1	140	135	7	2182	101
C06 CAV SCDN	39.54	53.65	.CC	.CC	.CC	27	10.5/1	46	26	220	3	231
C07 CAV SCDN	100.00	.CC	.CC	.CC	.CC	4	13.5/1	0	26	0	0	0
C08 CAV SCDN	24.18	68.13	.CC	.CC	.CC	4	2.5/1	3	9	0	332	2
C09 CAV SCDN	67.03	15.38	.CC	.CC	.CC	5	25.8/1	11	92	0	20	18
C10 CAV SCDN	87.51	9.89	.CC	.CC	.CC	11	46.4/1	64	177	38	122	8
C11 CAV SCDN	43.96	56.04	.CC	.CC	.CC	6	16.7/1	7	27	15	4	20
C12 CAV SCDN	78.02	.CC	.CC	.CC	.CC	13	37.9/1	38	34	3940	100	608
C13 CAV SCDN	23.08	67.03	.CC	.CC	.CC	8	3.4/1	0	14	8	0	0
C14 CAV SCDN	51.65	37.36	.CC	.CC	.CC	20	18.4/1	18	227	152	4040	301
C15 CAV SCDN	74.73	.CC	.CC	.CC	.CC	9	27.3/1	30	108	0	4	1
C16 CAV SCDN	36.26	63.74	.CC	.CC	.CC	4	15.8/1	30	8	2	0	5
C17 CAV SCDN	82.42	.CC	.CC	.CC	.CC	27	12.9/1	87	114	0	400	20
C18 CAV SCDN												
AVERAGE	58.56	25.58	.CC	.CC	.CC	10.1	21.8/1	30.7	67.5	250.9	429.2	115.0

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RANGER BATTALIONS

UNITS	EFFECT			RESULTS				CACHES									
	PCT TIME CRT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	EN HEIM	FRIENDLY KIA	GAS RATIO	ENEMY	WEAPONS	CPIC	SURR	CPIC	LCST	WEAPONS	FCCD	LES	100 LES APPC
C11 RANGER BN	59.34	4.40	.CC	.CC	32	8	4.0/1	1	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C21 RANGER BN	61.54	28.57	.CC	.CC	34	5	2.7/1	12	0	5	0	0	0	10	1	0	0
C22 RANGER BN	84.62	6.75	.CC	.CC	145	21	6.8/1	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	44	0	364
C23 RANGER BN	47.25	32.97	.CC	.CC	35	22	8.7/1	73	0	8	0	0	13	0	0	0	0
C30 RANGER BN	45.05	54.95	.CC	.CC	422	50	35.2/1	30	1	123	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C31 RANGER BN	87.91	.CC	.CC	.CC	152	12	2.9/1	28	1	52	0	0	0	63	0	0	5
C32 RANGER BN	40.66	.CC	.CC	.CC	37	12	2.5/1	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C33 RANGER BN	59.34	40.66	.CC	.CC	50	4	7.5/1	12	0	15	0	0	0	0	200	0	1
C34 RANGER BN	59.34	34.07	.CC	.CC	5	5	0.2/1	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C35 RANGER BN	.00	97.60	.CC	.CC	5	0	0.7/1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C36 RANGER BN	72.53	6.75	.CC	.CC	177	13	13.6/1	51	0	31	0	0	2	18	1205	0	2
C37 RANGER BN	32.97	47.25	.CC	.CC	67	5	13.4/1	12	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C38 RANGER BN	20.88	71.43	.CC	.CC	18	5	3.6/1	4	0	10	0	0	0	3	0	0	1
C39 RANGER BN	60.44	21.58	.CC	.CC	93	5	10.5/1	29	0	10	0	0	0	2	0	0	12
C41 RANGER BN	84.62	.CC	.CC	.CC	329	22	14.3/1	30	0	93	0	0	0	0	40	0	51
C42 RANGER BN	53.85	14.25	.CC	.CC	130	35	3.7/1	10	0	62	0	0	0	17	12	241	0
C43 RANGER BN	67.03	.CC	.CC	.CC	58	7	8.3/1	2	0	3	0	0	0	320	34	115	0
C44 RANGER BN	49.45	40.66	.CC	.CC	68	15	4.5/1	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	400
O51 RANGER BN	51.65	5.89	.CC	.CC	118	33	3.6/1	1	0	14	0	0	0	0	26	0	0
C52 RANGER BN	56.04	27.47	.CC	.CC	428	35	12.2/1	200	5	115	0	0	0	115	57	0	84
AVERAGE	54.72	27.15	.CC	.CC	133.8	16.1	7.7/1	24.9	.3	30.1	.8	27.7	.8	85.3	64.0	64.0	0

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VIETNAMESE MARINE DIVISION

UNITS	EFFCRT				RESULTS				CACHES			
	PCT TIME CPT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	EN ELIM	FRIENDLY KIA	CAS RATIO	ENEMY CPTC SURR	WEAPONS CFTD LCST	WEAPONS FCCD	ICC LBS	ICC AMMC
001 MARINE BN	97.80	.CC	.CC	.CC	166	15	8.7/1	43	C	42	8	10C
002 MARINE BN	95.71	.CC	.CC	.CC	471	28	16.8/1	18	1	148	22	15C
003 MARINE BN	62.64	.CC	.CC	.CC	30	3	10.0/1	C	C	7	0	C
004 MARINE BN	76.52	.CC	.CC	.CC	294	15	15.5/1	98	C	165	201	34C
005 MARINE BN	63.74	.CC	.CC	.CC	132	17	7.8/1	29	C	24	C	C
006 MARINE BN	50.11	.CC	.CC	.CC	131	25	5.2/1	15	C	15	3	C
007 MARINE BN	85.71	.CC	.CC	.CC	140	14	8.8/1	22	C	26	17	C
008 MARINE BN	59.02	.CC	.CC	.CC	3	C	3.0/1	0	C	4	C	C
AVERAGE	78.51	2.72	.CC	.CC	170.9	15.8	10.8/1	30.6	.1	54.2	21.3	73.7
												32.1

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11/15/1977, 10:00 AM - 11/15/1977, 10:00 AM

ORGANIZATION	ACT TIME IN		SECURITY		ACT TIME IN		SECURITY		ACT TIME IN		SECURITY		ACT TIME IN		SECURITY		ACT TIME IN		SECURITY		ACT TIME IN		SECURITY	
	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG	1ST DTG	2ND DTG
1 DIV	75.61	42.33	14.00	14.40	1.17	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
2 DIV	54.63	47.09	15.14	24.19	7.15	15.44	3.05	2.00	4.20	7.32	4.20	7.32	4.20	7.32	4.20	7.32	4.20	7.32	4.20	7.32	4.20	7.32	4.20	7.32
3 DIV	54.63	52.15	40.24	24.59	1.22	2.13	1.22	1.22	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73
4 DIV	54.63	44.37	19.13	24.27	2.25	4.35	1.22	1.22	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67	5.67
5 DIV	19.00	45.34	8.26	23.50	31.30	13.30	35.11	5.05	2.01	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72	2.72
6 DIV	35.63	45.57	31.04	17.44	13.52	11.75	5.30	12.57	9.34	7.32	9.34	7.32	9.34	7.32	9.34	7.32	9.34	7.32	9.34	7.32	9.34	7.32	9.34	7.32
7 DIV	37.71	41.20	45.42	47.85	5.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
8 DIV	27.14	42.68	23.33	34.41	13.32	10.71	14.21	7.55	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73	4.73
9 DIV	79.69	74.64	10.62	16.53	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
10 DIV	75.61	41.47	10.71	6.15	4.53	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20	4.20
11 DIV	50.45	57.21	6.61	1.82	15.01	24.91	3.97	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
12 DIV	55.55	74.79	9.31	7.33	13.44	9.44	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32	1.32
13 DIV	51.41	58.61	18.45	17.09	2.14	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
14 DIV	63.19	65.44	1.12	7.12	5.97	3.33	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
15 DIV	52.76	59.03	7.97	5.75	4.71	3.22	1.52	1.52	3.56	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60	4.60
16 DIV TOTALS	56.62	62.00	14.08	14.91	17.27	3.42	4.01	1.12	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81	3.81
17 DIV 1 CTZ	59.48	40.45	23.44	49.13	4.35	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
18 DIV 2 CTZ	12.75	34.43	81.11	48.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
19 DIV 3 CTZ	60.51	61.47	20.71	3.93	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
20 DIV 4 CTZ	60.67	66.89	12.26	15.08	1.15	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
21 DIV TOTALS	51.61	50.52	20.26	25.65	1.15	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
22 DIV 1 CTZ	52.22	47.64	31.30	32.24	1.00	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
23 DIV 2 CTZ	57.14	52.46	12.77	22.95	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
24 DIV 3 CTZ	29.63	52.09	55.93	40.87	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
25 DIV 4 CTZ	61.65	65.57	23.33	17.15	1.00	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
26 DIV TOTALS	44.06	54.34	37.65	24.95	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
27 DIV	71.02	73.77	11.26	10.93	5.28	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
28 DIV	84.63	75.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
29 DIV UNITS	57.23	62.45	25.60	21.15	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22	1.22
30 DIV/VNMC	56.73	62.13	17.37	16.72	3.15	4.71	3.56	1.44	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12	5.12
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ANNEX D

Advisors' Assessment Tables

These tables depict the advisors' assessment of divisions, separate regiments, and special organizations as derived from responses to the Quarterly Effectiveness Report (SEER Questionnaire as revised, effective 4th Qtr CY 69). Battalion ratings are derived from the combination of battalion and regimental advisors' assessments. The regimental ratings are derived from the combination of regimental and division advisors' assessments.

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1 DIVISION 1 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	95.33	77.14	95.00	80.00	80.00	73.33	93.33	92.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
1 REGT	96.00	72.73	100.00	80.00	80.00	73.33	92.59	92.00
2 REGT	96.00	74.55	100.00	86.67	90.00	76.67	87.69	94.00
3 REGT	97.14	81.82	100.00	100.00	80.00	70.00	89.66	100.00
54 REGT	93.33	75.00	93.33	80.00	70.00	60.00	85.93	88.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	95.62	76.02	98.33	86.67	77.50	70.00	88.97	93.50
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 1 REGT	55.20	76.92	0.0	86.67	66.67	72.86	86.67	86.67
2 BN 1 REGT	72.22	75.29	0.0	68.57	75.67	63.75	66.15	76.67
3 BN 1 REGT	82.31	83.75	0.0	80.00	90.00	67.14	82.73	91.67
4 BN 1 REGT	92.17	78.46	0.0	68.57	80.00	60.00	70.53	82.00
1 BN 2 REGT	96.43	83.89	100.00	65.00	83.64	74.37	83.77	96.67
2 BN 2 REGT	66.36	73.53	100.00	67.69	66.67	64.17	66.53	65.88
3 BN 2 REGT	88.52	80.00	0.0	70.00	72.73	85.00	83.40	90.00
4 BN 2 REGT	83.40	81.18	0.0	68.00	73.33	63.75	70.91	88.57
5 BN 2 REGT	90.37	81.76	0.0	65.00	87.27	76.25	82.59	91.67
1 BN 3 REGT	96.30	90.00	100.00	80.00	90.00	77.50	85.08	98.33
2 BN 3 REGT	94.81	90.00	100.00	80.00	90.00	73.75	84.83	93.33
3 BN 3 REGT	97.04	90.00	100.00	80.00	90.00	73.75	86.90	95.00
4 BN 3 REGT	94.07	90.00	100.00	77.14	90.00	72.50	86.21	91.67
1 BN 54 REGT	89.41	78.67	88.00	56.67	86.67	75.83	74.87	89.09
2 BN 54 REGT	81.70	79.26	60.00	76.67	76.67	68.70	79.67	82.61
3 BN 54 REGT	63.70	78.18	90.00	66.67	78.33	60.00	76.77	64.29

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1 DIVISION		1 CORPS						
ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PER S/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
INF BN RATINGS								
4 BN 54 REGT	84.00	75.17	0.0	70.77	88.33	73.33	80.00	74.55
INF BN AVERAGE	86.35	81.53	49.29	72.20	81.59	70.74	79.21	85.80

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2 DIVISION 1 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PEPS/ ADPATE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTRL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATINGS	84.67	64.00	85.00	73.33	70.00	60.00	76.21	83.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
4 REGT	97.33	71.43	77.50	83.33	80.00	58.18	87.86	88.00
5 REGT	90.67	71.00	92.50	83.33	85.00	70.91	75.33	78.00
6 REGT	86.21	66.00	76.00	83.33	65.00	58.18	57.08	72.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	91.40	69.48	82.00	83.33	70.00	62.42	73.76	79.33
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 4 REGT	77.59	82.78	90.00	70.00	90.00	59.38	72.00	75.00
2 BN 4 REGT	63.79	69.44	65.00	70.00	65.00	44.37	63.00	60.00
3 BN 4 REGT	92.50	78.89	70.00	71.43	75.00	56.47	76.00	91.67
4 BN 4 REGT	83.21	77.22	72.50	71.43	65.00	56.25	62.67	82.50
1 BN 5 REGT	67.23	70.00	80.00	80.00	73.33	68.57	62.17	67.50
2 BN 5 REGT	78.49	76.67	92.50	82.36	63.33	58.75	61.51	66.67
3 BN 5 REGT	77.45	78.06	84.29	77.14	68.33	64.37	72.50	78.33
4 BN 5 REGT	89.29	83.75	95.00	94.29	86.67	66.25	78.15	86.67
1 BN 6 REGT	83.70	78.57	75.00	89.23	80.00	74.67	77.92	90.00
2 BN 6 REGT	70.67	76.00	100.00	89.23	73.33	41.74	68.42	70.53
3 BN 6 REGT	76.67	75.20	55.00	80.00	76.67	51.43	55.22	76.67
4 BN 6 REGT	76.30	72.86	80.00	83.33	80.00	63.08	60.00	75.00
INF BN AVERAGE	78.07	76.02	80.77	79.91	74.72	58.81	67.46	76.71

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22 DIVISION 2 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PEPS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATING	75.20	64.00	85.00	88.00	70.00	40.00	72.86	80.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
40 REGT	91.33	82.11	94.29	100.00	85.00	52.00	87.35	93.33
41 REGT	70.67	69.47	80.00	80.00	80.00	48.00	66.05	64.44
42 REGT	90.77	56.36	95.00	53.33	80.00	55.00	79.23	84.00
47 REGT	70.67	69.09	80.00	66.67	50.00	43.33	55.00	71.11
REGT HQ AVERAGE	82.36	69.26	87.32	75.00	76.25	49.58	71.91	79.22
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 40 REGT	88.15	87.78	100.00	95.71	96.67	58.12	87.93	80.83
2 BN 40 REGT	91.92	89.44	70.00	97.14	100.00	56.47	81.03	93.33
3 BN 40 REGT	92.69	90.00	100.00	94.29	100.00	58.12	85.86	92.50
4 BN 40 REGT	96.92	92.78	100.00	92.86	100.00	77.50	91.72	98.33
1 BN 41 REGT	67.92	71.67	93.33	80.00	83.33	53.13	57.83	67.50
2 BN 41 REGT	52.59	71.67	100.00	50.00	83.33	44.37	50.45	55.00
3 BN 41 REGT	63.51	70.29	73.33	60.00	78.33	35.00	55.00	64.17
4 BN 41 REGT	68.73	73.33	82.50	55.00	74.55	50.00	51.54	65.00
1 BN 42 REGT	68.89	65.63	95.00	67.50	78.33	59.26	61.58	57.50
2 BN 42 REGT	82.14	72.22	92.50	73.75	79.33	64.52	66.98	79.17
3 BN 42 REGT	77.07	75.43	97.50	62.50	82.00	59.35	77.62	74.74
4 BN 42 REGT	81.45	68.82	92.50	68.57	78.33	58.06	72.73	75.83
1 BN 47 REGT	67.41	76.67	73.33	72.86	73.33	43.75	60.00	60.00
2 BN 47 REGT	83.02	80.00	80.00	73.75	80.00	56.37	65.77	87.50
3 BN 47 REGT	77.04	71.67	76.67	73.85	65.00	38.75	53.58	70.83
4 BN 47 REGT	75.56	75.56	76.67	78.57	78.33	46.25	64.23	70.00

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22 DIVISION 2 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
INF BN RATINGS								
INF BN AVERAGE	77.19	77.06	87.71	74.77	83.12	53.75	67.74	74.51

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23 DIVISION 2 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECTIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATING	74.25	67.00	85.00	76.00	70.00	58.00	71.43	68.00
FEGT HQ RATINGS								
44 FEGT	68.80	85.33	88.00	76.67	80.00	42.86	72.35	51.76
45 FEGT	82.86	61.11	85.00	76.67	80.00	68.89	79.55	83.00
53 FEGT	67.14	56.00	91.43	70.00	66.67	34.00	49.55	65.26
FEGT HQ AVERAGE	72.93	67.48	88.14	74.44	75.56	48.58	67.15	66.68
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 44 FEGT	83.70	78.57	85.00	46.67	76.67	71.43	63.46	81.82
2 BN 44 FEGT	82.31	78.67	86.67	52.00	80.00	71.43	68.46	83.64
3 BN 44 FEGT	75.00	77.33	52.50	60.00	86.67	64.62	70.43	70.91
4 BN 44 FEGT	67.41	76.25	65.00	50.00	90.00	41.25	65.83	70.00
1 BN 45 FEGT	64.21	70.30	85.00	78.44	85.00	64.35	71.64	85.00
2 BN 45 FEGT	77.82	76.55	85.71	61.43	71.67	65.22	73.62	83.48
3 BN 45 FEGT	97.41	81.71	100.00	85.71	98.33	75.00	82.14	95.83
4 BN 45 FEGT	95.71	77.76	90.00	82.86	93.33	68.75	89.63	98.33
1 BN 53 FEGT	59.59	66.25	91.00	94.29	78.18	56.67	61.38	65.22
2 BN 53 FEGT	61.18	65.81	95.00	80.00	70.91	32.86	53.82	60.00
3 BN 53 FEGT	76.36	70.00	91.43	85.00	89.00	69.23	76.14	80.00
4 BN 53 FEGT	77.41	74.67	95.00	100.00	83.64	64.17	77.65	80.83
INF BN AVERAGE	78.18	74.49	85.11	76.37	83.62	62.09	71.60	78.75

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5 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION		OPER EFFECTI VENESS	PERF/	CIVIL	COMBAT	SUPPLY	TRAIN-	COMMAND	LEADER
			MORALE	AFFAIRS	SUPPORT	MAINT	ING	STAFF	SHIP
DIV HQ	RATING	84.29	81.90	90.00	90.00	80.00	50.00	80.00	83.16
REGT HQ RATINGS									
7 REGT		94.62	85.00	93.33	90.00	70.00	58.33	83.27	94.74
8 REGT		91.85	77.14	82.86	80.00	65.00	55.00	74.23	91.00
9 REGT		88.97	74.29	88.57	82.00	70.00	53.33	71.70	87.00
REGT HQ	AVERAGE	91.81	78.01	88.25	87.33	63.33	55.56	76.40	90.58
INF BN RATINGS									
1 BN	7 REGT	82.69	83.87	80.00	90.00	80.00	60.00	73.08	81.90
2 BN	7 REGT	88.32	83.75	80.00	100.00	80.00	69.03	83.08	86.67
3 BN	7 REGT	85.38	84.38	86.67	91.43	76.67	66.45	78.85	86.67
4 BN	7 REGT	89.43	85.62	86.67	92.50	75.67	63.23	75.15	95.71
1 BN	8 REGT	87.41	82.35	83.33	85.00	76.67	71.88	68.46	88.33
2 BN	8 REGT	84.00	81.70	86.67	90.00	68.33	63.12	74.07	83.33
3 BN	8 REGT	86.30	76.25	93.33	93.33	78.33	66.25	69.36	84.17
4 BN	8 REGT	78.15	76.36	50.00	85.00	78.33	69.37	74.80	88.33
1 BN	9 REGT	90.71	89.44	87.50	87.49	76.67	60.00	85.28	88.33
2 BN	9 REGT	79.26	83.75	100.00	90.00	86.67	52.50	80.00	78.33
3 BN	9 REGT	82.59	81.11	100.00	81.67	75.67	56.87	77.45	70.17
4 BN	9 REGT	69.64	77.06	100.00	81.67	73.33	62.50	65.00	70.00
INF BN	AVERAGE	83.66	82.14	87.01	89.02	77.36	63.43	75.55	83.41

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18 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECTIVENESS	PEFS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	90.00	74.29	96.67	86.67	80.00	57.14	79.62	83.16
REGT HQ RATINGS								
43 REGT	95.71	80.00	100.00	90.00	85.00	56.67	77.67	89.00
48 REGT	88.57	74.55	90.00	73.33	70.00	40.00	70.00	82.00
52 REGT	95.71	78.18	100.00	93.33	90.00	60.00	81.33	88.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	93.33	77.58	96.67	85.56	81.67	52.22	76.33	86.33
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 43 REGT	87.17	82.94	96.00	76.36	94.00	61.43	72.34	81.74
2 BN 43 REGT	85.56	74.46	95.00	76.25	80.00	63.12	71.19	80.83
3 BN 43 REGT	81.63	74.19	90.00	69.09	76.67	57.24	57.60	70.43
4 BN 43 REGT	75.71	77.22	87.50	61.05	70.00	57.50	60.67	67.50
1 BN 48 REGT	95.00	81.14	67.50	61.67	93.33	72.50	91.11	90.83
2 BN 48 REGT	95.36	87.78	95.00	81.67	86.67	64.37	79.26	90.00
3 BN 48 REGT	71.43	76.11	72.50	80.00	60.00	47.50	68.46	78.33
4 BN 48 REGT	79.29	81.18	85.00	78.46	83.33	22.86	65.42	88.33
1 BN 52 REGT	90.71	85.00	90.00	73.33	70.00	74.37	83.33	95.00
2 BN 52 REGT	84.07	82.86	88.57	100.00	85.00	66.87	76.21	80.83
3 BN 52 REGT	100.00	90.00	100.00	85.71	100.00	70.00	77.33	96.67
4 BN 52 REGT	74.44	75.43	86.67	84.29	76.67	52.50	54.78	75.00
INF BN AVERAGE	85.03	80.73	87.81	77.32	81.31	59.19	71.47	82.96

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25 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	CPEF EFFEC TIVENESS	PER S/ VORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	CCMRAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
CIV HQ RATING	87.86	76.19	85.00	83.33	75.00	76.00	77.92	88.42
REGT HQ RATINGS								
46 REGT	90.00	75.50	88.57	80.00	90.00	76.00	83.21	91.00
49 REGT	93.33	77.27	80.00	82.33	75.00	55.00	82.86	90.00
50 REGT	90.00	73.33	76.67	86.67	80.00	70.00	77.14	87.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	91.11	75.39	81.75	83.33	81.67	67.00	81.07	89.33
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 46 REGT	91.43	81.11	93.33	84.00	86.67	76.67	83.81	88.33
2 BN 46 REGT	85.20	82.31	95.00	100.00	76.00	64.80	78.85	87.27
3 BN 46 REGT	89.29	78.75	95.00	71.43	93.33	81.33	77.78	85.00
4 BN 46 REGT	90.00	84.44	95.00	80.00	86.67	74.29	82.86	88.33
1 BN 49 REGT	82.22	82.22	87.50	68.57	73.33	51.61	63.48	76.67
2 BN 49 REGT	78.93	77.22	72.50	64.00	70.00	51.87	64.35	78.33
3 BN 49 REGT	84.07	81.67	77.50	60.00	83.33	55.00	76.96	65.83
4 BN 49 REGT	58.15	86.67	82.50	61.82	95.00	78.13	92.61	91.67
1 BN 50 REGT	85.22	78.46	88.57	80.00	80.00	76.47	78.95	81.00
2 BN 50 REGT	65.36	61.11	65.00	66.67	83.33	53.75	61.43	63.33
3 BN 50 REGT	64.44	77.58	68.57	70.00	76.67	60.00	64.49	62.50
4 BN 50 REGT	89.63	86.25	97.50	85.00	85.00	78.57	85.00	90.00
INF BN AVERAGE	83.66	79.82	84.83	74.29	82.44	66.87	75.88	79.86

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7 DIVISION 4 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	87.41	69.47	73.33	83.33	75.00	52.50	79.24	83.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
10 REGT	94.29	79.09	85.71	86.67	75.00	60.00	91.05	89.00
11 REGT	76.00	66.36	68.00	73.33	75.00	54.55	69.30	76.00
12 REGT	84.29	57.89	60.00	86.67	85.00	40.00	65.79	75.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	84.86	67.78	71.24	82.22	78.33	51.52	75.38	80.00
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 10 REGT	88.52	83.89	82.50	98.33	83.33	66.87	75.79	85.00
2 BN 10 REGT	88.52	83.89	82.50	98.33	83.33	67.50	75.79	85.00
3 BN 10 REGT	90.00	83.33	86.67	93.33	90.00	58.75	90.00	86.67
4 BN 10 REGT	85.56	73.71	75.00	81.43	80.00	51.25	72.88	85.00
1 BN 11 REGT	86.15	79.44	75.00	93.85	88.33	63.75	79.63	86.67
2 BN 11 REGT	78.18	73.33	80.00	98.33	88.33	68.75	81.67	75.83
3 BN 11 REGT	80.38	75.00	57.50	92.73	91.67	61.25	72.00	80.83
4 BN 11 REGT	76.60	74.44	57.50	92.73	91.67	61.25	72.00	75.83
1 BN 12 REGT	69.57	70.00	45.00	76.67	68.33	56.92	71.33	72.00
2 BN 12 REGT	79.26	67.78	40.00	75.00	76.67	45.00	43.33	70.00
3 BN 12 REGT	78.93	67.78	40.00	82.86	76.67	43.75	42.67	70.00
4 BN 12 REGT	82.22	90.00	100.00	84.00	86.67	73.75	74.29	86.67
INF BN AVERAGE	81.99	76.05	68.47	88.97	83.75	59.90	70.95	79.96

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9 DIVISION 4 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PER S/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	CCMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	91.43	56.84	76.67	80.00	70.00	53.33	77.56	80.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
14 REGT	89.66	55.45	70.00	76.67	75.00	44.00	71.36	61.00
15 REGT	86.43	58.75	73.33	76.00	60.00	62.86	79.15	80.00
16 REGT	88.97	47.50	86.67	80.00	70.00	60.00	69.57	79.00
REGT HQ AVERAGE	88.35	53.90	76.67	77.56	68.33	55.62	73.36	73.33
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 14 REGT	83.33	62.86	68.00	90.00	78.33	80.00	83.00	75.65
2 BN 14 REGT	71.67	68.57	60.00	92.31	81.67	38.95	64.14	60.00
3 BN 14 REGT	79.61	59.38	76.00	88.89	78.33	40.00	78.10	76.52
4 BN 14 REGT	73.96	67.74	60.00	82.86	70.00	52.63	63.41	64.35
1 BN 15 REGT	91.20	84.71	100.00	85.71	93.33	62.50	83.48	86.67
2 BN 15 REGT	92.41	92.86	75.00	88.57	76.67	64.29	71.67	95.00
3 BN 15 REGT	88.57	73.75	80.00	83.33	93.33	60.00	78.75	90.00
4 BN 15 REGT	85.49	78.75	75.00	100.00	90.00	71.43	78.33	85.00
1 BN 16 REGT	87.84	76.19	80.00	82.22	78.18	0.00	92.50	91.58
2 BN 16 REGT	87.41	71.20	90.00	81.11	83.64	73.33	91.11	91.00
3 BN 16 REGT	84.15	67.69	80.00	92.86	74.00	50.00	77.39	84.76
4 BN 16 REGT	82.75	67.69	88.00	91.11	74.00	57.78	79.26	86.67
INF BN AVERAGE	84.03	71.78	77.67	88.25	80.96	54.24	78.76	82.27

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21 DIVISION 4 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PEES/ MIRALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	97.24	60.00	88.00	83.33	75.00	52.50	85.96	87.00
FFGT HQ RATINGS								
31 REGT	87.41	47.00	86.67	80.00	60.00	40.00	73.20	71.00
32 REGT	95.56	77.89	93.33	83.33	86.67	62.22	85.00	91.00
33 REGT	90.71	60.00	85.71	80.00	90.00	50.00	75.32	74.00
FFGT HQ AVERAGE	91.23	61.63	88.57	81.11	78.89	50.74	77.84	78.67
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 31 REGT	69.60	57.42	88.57	76.67	71.67	39.33	65.83	70.00
2 BN 31 REGT	81.25	67.59	93.33	81.43	90.00	65.88	74.21	78.00
3 BN 31 REGT	67.20	61.76	83.33	78.57	65.00	38.40	58.18	60.91
4 BN 31 REGT	69.80	65.00	88.00	72.73	81.67	38.52	64.00	64.17
1 BN 32 REGT	90.40	88.75	100.00	82.86	96.67	54.07	75.59	91.67
2 BN 32 REGT	80.00	85.00	90.00	92.00	86.67	42.67	46.36	80.00
3 BN 32 REGT	78.60	77.60	100.00	83.33	78.00	30.00	56.67	65.26
4 BN 32 REGT	78.18	68.39	90.00	86.67	82.00	28.75	44.00	65.45
1 BN 33 REGT	61.96	74.67	100.00	77.14	80.00	46.15	56.67	61.67
2 BN 33 REGT	82.08	78.75	90.00	80.00	86.67	48.75	73.04	76.67
3 BN 33 REGT	80.37	69.03	100.00	94.29	76.67	77.50	78.40	86.67
4 BN 33 REGT	85.93	67.50	100.00	92.00	76.67	77.50	78.40	88.33
INF BN AVERAGE	77.11	71.79	93.60	83.14	80.14	48.96	64.36	74.07

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51 INFANTRY REGIMENT 1 CORPS

CPEF		PER S/ MOFALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
ORGANIZATION	EFFECTIVENESS							
INF REGT RATING								
51 REGT	90.34	48.00	70.00	83.33	90.00	73.33	91.54	91.58
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 51 REGT	83.57	75.00	40.00	60.00	80.00	67.50	79.17	86.67
2 BN 51 REGT	85.00	85.33	70.00	67.50	83.33	73.75	80.83	90.00
3 BN 51 REGT	97.86	90.59	80.00	68.00	100.00	78.75	93.46	90.00
4 BN 51 REGT	82.14	80.00	60.67	62.50	76.67	68.75	77.50	80.00
INF BN AVERAGE	87.14	82.73	64.17	64.50	85.00	72.19	83.99	86.67

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ALPINE DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PEFS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
1 ABN BN	85.19	79.23	C.O	61.67	90.00	83.48	67.11	86.36
2 ABN BN	94.83	96.00	100.00	96.67	100.00	97.14	99.20	100.00
3 ABN BN	79.63	90.34	100.00	75.38	81.67	56.25	78.60	85.83
5 ABN BN	80.82	81.43	85.00	75.00	86.67	64.90	72.69	91.30
6 ABN BN	84.44	84.00	100.00	83.33	75.00	61.25	68.26	85.00
7 ABN BN	88.36	87.86	90.00	82.86	85.00	72.00	79.15	95.83
8 ABN BN	92.96	90.97	96.67	80.00	95.00	84.00	87.11	93.04
9 ABN BN	84.23	90.34	C.O	83.33	95.00	91.43	85.41	86.09
11 ABN BN	79.63	92.00	100.00	78.18	86.67	74.55	74.89	90.83
AVERAGE	86.02	88.02	74.63	79.60	88.33	76.10	73.16	90.48

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ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADROONS

ORGANIZATION	CPEF EFFEC TIVENESS	PER S/ M F A L E	CIVIL A F F A I R S	SUMAT S U P P O R T	SUPPLY M A I N T	TRAIN- I N G	COMMAND CONTROL S T A F F	LEADER S H I P
17 CAV SQDN	88.89	77.65	100.00	74.29	86.67	41.25	65.00	91.67
7 CAV SQDN	94.43	88.39	95.00	95.00	86.67	80.00	83.63	80.00
11 CAV SQDN	72.86	83.75	70.00	100.00	76.67	52.86	62.61	73.33
4 CAV SQDN	85.56	83.33	90.00	65.71	96.67	47.50	83.10	92.73
3 CAV SQDN	82.08	80.67	100.00	72.00	80.00	52.38	63.81	83.48
14 CAV SQDN	98.52	93.75	100.00	100.00	90.00	80.00	81.43	95.00
8 CAV SQDN	70.18	72.22	75.00	63.33	86.67	62.50	54.83	66.67
15 CAV SQDN	68.89	76.92	80.00	72.00	86.67	32.00	57.00	67.37
18 CAV SQDN	88.08	80.77	100.00	71.25	93.33	84.00	86.96	74.17
1 CAV SQDN	81.15	80.62	100.00	100.00	83.33	53.91	73.02	88.70
5 CAV SQDN	94.29	89.71	100.00	100.00	96.67	70.00	84.83	93.33
10 CAV SQDN	88.52	84.83	90.00	63.57	93.33	81.54	83.20	92.50
12 CAV SQDN	67.14	82.78	88.00	76.00	83.33	58.12	69.47	73.33
16 CAV SQDN	82.14	75.76	55.00	75.00	90.00	58.33	62.08	77.50
6 CAV SQDN	95.71	91.76	90.00	90.00	100.00	72.67	92.11	96.67
2 CAV SQDN	94.44	82.94	88.00	93.33	86.67	67.20	80.00	94.17
9 CAV SQDN	59.18	61.43	70.00	92.00	80.00	35.65	49.71	54.55
AVERAGE	83.07	82.22	82.29	84.03	86.86	63.52	74.05	82.66

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RANGER BATTALION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PEFS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
21 FANGER BN	70.71	77.78	50.00	66.67	80.00	50.00	65.38	69.17
37 FANGER BN	72.86	80.00	60.00	70.00	70.00	48.67	63.08	70.83
39 FANGER BN	74.29	75.00	42.50	73.33	81.67	48.57	57.08	82.50
11 FANGER BN	83.20	76.00	70.00	67.50	68.33	64.57	76.92	86.67
22 FANGER BN	96.00	74.44	72.50	83.75	86.67	73.33	81.36	96.67
23 FANGER BN	64.23	71.67	73.33	55.00	71.67	52.90	68.52	64.17
30 FANGER BN	89.64	87.50	92.00	45.71	90.00	80.00	88.33	91.67
31 FANGER BN	85.38	86.47	50.00	72.86	78.33	45.33	78.14	92.50
33 FANGER BN	81.07	75.88	71.43	75.00	70.00	52.90	65.22	73.33
34 FANGER BN	82.45	82.76	100.00	80.00	76.67	72.00	81.43	84.17
35 FANGER BN	77.45	82.86	100.00	75.00	66.67	59.00	72.00	83.33
36 FANGER BN	66.53	79.44	30.00	86.25	86.67	63.12	72.96	55.83
38 FANGER BN	88.85	78.13	93.33	70.00	81.67	60.00	78.30	76.67
51 FANGER BN	87.59	84.29	90.00	86.67	80.00	53.33	80.87	84.33
52 RANGER BN	90.00	88.57	90.00	97.14	88.33	54.67	74.18	76.67
32 RANGER BN	52.14	66.87	76.00	90.77	58.33	55.17	66.83	53.04
41 FANGER BN	54.00	60.59	46.67	74.29	76.67	44.00	64.78	57.50
42 FANGER BN	95.00	77.06	82.50	62.35	88.33	75.00	79.67	91.67
43 FANGER BN	80.00	76.00	60.00	78.67	88.33	73.91	76.80	79.17
44 FANGER BN	82.50	76.47	71.43	82.86	86.67	64.14	73.06	81.67
AVERAGE	78.70	77.89	71.08	74.69	80.25	60.04	73.30	77.78

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VIETNAMESE MARINE DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PEPS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
1 MARINE BN	95.19	90.00	80.00	88.57	95.00	73.75	87.20	96.67
2 MARINE BN	92.22	87.22	83.33	85.71	93.33	61.25	77.20	96.67
3 MARINE BN	98.15	87.78	80.00	88.57	90.00	72.50	92.00	96.67
4 MARINE BN	91.11	87.22	77.50	82.86	80.00	67.50	81.20	95.00
5 MARINE BN	94.81	86.29	77.50	98.57	91.67	67.86	84.90	93.33
6 MARINE BN	89.30	85.71	86.67	88.57	86.67	63.12	76.40	93.33
7 MARINE BN	91.48	88.33	90.00	88.57	90.00	71.48	82.80	96.67
AVERAGE	93.04	87.51	82.14	88.78	89.52	68.27	83.10	95.48

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ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER- ATIVE- NESS	PEPS/ MOBILE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
I CORPS								
44 ARTY BN	82.35	85.00	-0.00	-0.00	76.00	73.33	80.00	94.20
64 ARTY BN	83.53	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	72.00	73.33	80.00	97.14
10 ARTY BN	85.65	87.14	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	66.00	75.00	96.00
41 ARTY BN	86.52	87.14	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	74.00	77.50	96.00
12 ARTY BN	86.52	86.15	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	74.00	77.50	96.00
14 ARTY BN	83.33	84.35	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	63.15	73.85	94.12
48 ARTY BN	83.04	82.86	-0.00	-0.00	86.67	64.00	77.50	94.00
62 ARTY BN	91.30	90.77	-0.00	-0.00	86.67	54.00	72.50	94.00
20 ARTY BN	71.89	81.82	-0.00	-0.00	72.73	60.00	68.57	73.33
21 ARTY BN	70.81	80.00	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	68.00	73.33	81.67
22 ARTY BN	71.35	84.76	-0.00	-0.00	72.73	60.00	67.27	83.08
23 ARTY BN	73.33	80.83	-0.00	-0.00	76.36	64.00	73.85	81.33
I CORPS AVERAGE	84.97	85.07	-0.00	-0.00	81.65	66.99	74.74	90.08
II CORPS								
37 ARTY BN	77.62	79.33	-0.00	-0.00	85.00	61.05	77.14	72.22
63 ARTY BN	69.57	81.23	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	57.78	100.00	88.00
220 ARTY BN	78.00	70.00	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	50.00	100.00	86.67
221 ARTY BN	80.00	76.00	-0.00	-0.00	60.00	0.00	0.00	86.67
222 ARTY BN	94.00	68.00	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	0.00	0.00	100.00
223 ARTY BN	76.67	78.75	-0.00	-0.00	76.67	52.73	62.50	69.33
230 ARTY BN	86.22	92.14	-0.00	-0.00	86.67	80.00	80.00	92.00
231 ARTY BN	86.67	91.43	-0.00	-0.00	86.67	87.50	100.00	91.00
232 ARTY BN	87.62	91.43	-0.00	-0.00	92.00	84.44	95.00	91.00
233 ARTY BN	84.76	95.00	-0.00	-0.00	84.00	82.50	100.00	91.00
II CORPS AVERAGE	82.11	82.34	-0.00	-0.00	80.10	55.60	71.46	86.69

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ARTILLERY BATTALIONS								
ORGANIZATION	EFFEC TIVENESS	REFS/ BUDGET	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
III CORPS								
46 ARTY BN	93.64	93.75	-0.00	-0.00	96.67	94.00	100.00	94.00
51 ARTY BN	92.09	88.39	-0.00	-0.00	93.33	71.58	94.55	96.47
50 ARTY BN	65.26	84.62	-0.00	-0.00	84.00	68.00	85.71	86.00
51 ARTY BN	69.00	84.62	-0.00	-0.00	84.00	68.00	85.71	86.00
52 ARTY BN	69.00	85.00	-0.00	-0.00	84.00	73.33	85.71	86.00
53 ARTY BN	69.00	83.33	-0.00	-0.00	84.00	73.33	85.71	86.00
140 ARTY BN	67.62	82.67	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	58.00	90.00	67.50
181 ARTY BN	80.95	88.24	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	60.00	82.50	86.67
142 ARTY BN	71.82	84.00	-0.00	-0.00	73.33	68.00	85.00	86.67
183 ARTY BN	77.27	86.67	-0.00	-0.00	90.00	63.00	82.50	86.67
250 ARTY BN	94.78	93.75	-0.00	-0.00	100.00	84.00	92.50	96.00
251 ARTY BN	89.57	88.75	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	82.00	87.50	90.00
252 ARTY BN	87.83	88.75	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	82.00	87.50	88.00
253 ARTY BN	90.43	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	83.16	87.50	90.00
III CORPS AVERAGE								
	79.83	87.32	-0.00	-0.00	86.62	73.46	87.31	87.57
IV CORPS								
47 ARTY BN	51.36	79.26	-0.00	-0.00	72.73	57.50	70.00	82.11
67 ARTY BN	68.84	75.38	-0.00	-0.00	82.00	56.25	70.00	68.00
68 ARTY BN	65.91	67.83	-0.00	-0.00	58.00	58.57	67.14	77.00
70 ARTY BN	69.09	84.29	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	55.00	82.50	86.67
71 ARTY BN	80.43	83.75	-0.00	-0.00	85.00	57.00	61.25	91.00
72 ARTY BN	77.83	85.00	-0.00	-0.00	81.67	40.00	63.75	94.00
73 ARTY BN	70.97	79.39	-0.00	-0.00	81.67	45.83	73.75	76.00
90 ARTY BN	73.91	85.00	-0.00	-0.00	81.67	59.00	79.75	92.00
91 ARTY BN	86.36	88.82	-0.00	-0.00	86.67	78.00	87.50	91.00
92 ARTY BN	81.82	78.82	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	55.00	76.25	82.00
93 ARTY BN	78.18	84.71	-0.00	-0.00	85.00	54.00	70.00	92.00
210 ARTY BN	69.30	50.00	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	60.00	67.50	82.00
211 ARTY BN	75.65	74.19	-0.00	-0.00	80.00	57.78	76.36	90.53
212 ARTY BN	80.93	86.87	-0.00	-0.00	73.33	58.89	86.67	91.00

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ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFEC TIVENESS	PER S/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIRS	COMBAT SUPPORT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	COMMAND CONTROL STAFF	LEADER SHIP
IV CORPS								
213 ARTY BN	84.55	80.00	-0.00	-0.00	70.00	64.00	85.00	92.00
IV CORPS AVERAGE	74.34	79.55	-0.00	-0.00	78.74	57.72	74.43	85.82

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AIRBORNE AND MARINE ARTILLERY

301 ABN ARTY	96.36	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	100.00	57.14	80.00	97.78
302 ABN ARTY	96.36	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	100.00	57.14	80.00	97.78
303 ABN ARTY	96.36	90.00	-0.00	-0.00	100.00	52.50	80.00	97.78
303 MAF ARTY	86.82	88.28	-0.00	-0.00	91.67	68.00	95.71	95.00
401 MAF ARTY	85.45	82.31	-0.00	-0.00	83.33	68.57	77.33	94.00
402 MAF ARTY	87.73	83.85	-0.00	-0.00	86.67	68.75	83.75	94.00
ABN/MAF AVERAGE	91.52	87.40	-0.00	-0.00	93.61	62.02	81.13	96.06

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ANNEX E

Combat Support Received

This annex presents the totals of various types of combat support received by maneuver battalions, as reported by battalion advisors. Also presented is the "per battalion share", or the total for the major organization divided by the number of maneuver battalions in that organization.

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ORGANIZATION	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED PER BN 2D QTR CY 70								
	ARTY ROUNDS	NAVAL GUNFIRE ROUNDS	HEL GUNSHIP SORTIES	FWD WING GUNSHIP SORTIES	TAC AIR SORTIES	HEL LIFT SORTIES	FWD WING LIFT SORTIES	HEL MED EVAC SORTIES	AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES
1st DIV	4084.11	61.17	45.5	.1	38.1	220.5	0	21.0	105.2
2d DIV	2465.00	0	39.6	.3	28.0	232.6	0	19.9	40.9
3d DIV	1832.50	0	21.7	4.2	42.0	76.0	0	22.7	45.5
4th DIV	3222.42	51.51	40.5	.	34.9	207.5	0	20.8	74.9
5th DIV	2440.83	0	27.4	1.0	10.5	256.0	4.0	10.5	96.0
6th DIV	1159.16	12.50	10.4	7.4	6.5	80.2	5.2	6.5	28.7
7th DIV	1960.00	0	43.0	22.2	85.5	162.2	2.0	18.5	48.2
8th DIV	1822.85	5.35	22.5	6.8	19.2	167.2	3.4	9.9	60.6
9th DIV	3245.00	0	64.5	1.0	30.8	268.0	0	23.5	21.9
10th DIV	1285.00	0	16.5	1.2	8.0	126.7	.5	5.7	26.1
11th DIV	1517.50	0	87.4	.2	12.5	280.4	0	19.5	6.7
12th DIV	2015.83	0	56.1	.8	17.1	225.0	.1	16.1	18.2
13th DIV	3205.00	0	44.9	3.4	6.8	313.6	0	26.5	34.5
14th DIV	2513.33	16.66	50.6	2.5	13.6	377.9	0	23.8	27.7
15th DIV	3205.00	10.00	51.1	1.4	5.5	197.5	0	8.0	13.2
16th DIV	2974.44	8.88	48.9	2.5	8.6	296.5	0	19.4	35.1
17th DIV	2534.06	11.55	43.1	2.4	19.7	227.7	.	16.9	43.0
18th DIV	6022.22	4.44	111.8	.5	39.8	226.7	8.0	26.7	127.1
19th DIV	3529.41	23.52	26.3	2.7	36.0	11.4	.4	21.0	25.7
20th DIV	2029.56	3.91	55.3	7.2	3.2	339.1	0	19.5	21.1
21st DIV	3110.00	0	45.8	5.2	32.5	157.9	.1	17.8	26.4
ARVN/USMC/TOTAL	2853.87	10.60	45.7	2.9	25.2	205.1	.9	17.9	42.8

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ORGANIZATION	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED IN JUNE 70								
	ARTY ROUNDS	NAVAL GUNSHIP ROUNDS	HEL GUNSHIP SORTIES	FAC AIRC GUNSHIP SORTIES	FAC AIR SORTIES	HEL FT SORTIES	FAC AG T SORTIES	HEL MED EVC SORTIES	AIR HEL SORTIES
1st DIV	60430	1040	774	5	648	3746	0	358	1780
2d DIV	29580	0	476	4	356	2792	0	239	491
3d DIV	7330	0	87	17	168	304	0	91	182
I Corps	106340	1040	1557	24	1152	6842	0	688	2462
2d DIV	29290	0	320	13	127	3072	49	126	1160
3d DIV	13917	150	125	89	71	963	39	78	345
4th DIV	7840	0	172	89	334	649	8	74	193
II Corps	51040	150	626	191	540	4684	96	278	1698
5th DIV	38940	0	774	13	370	3217	0	282	263
18th DIV	15420	0	198	13	97	1521	0	69	314
24th DIV	18210	0	1049	5	150	3365	0	232	81
III Corps	72570	0	2021	31	617	8103	0	583	658
7th DIV	38460	0	539	41	82	3764	0	318	415
9th DIV	30160	200	608	28	164	4535	0	286	333
21st DIV	38460	120	614	17	66	2368	0	96	159
IV Corps	107080	320	1761	86	312	10667	0	700	907
INF TOTAL	337030	1510	5745	332	2621	50396	103	2249	5725
AR	54200	40	1007	5	809	2041	22	241	1144
CV	60000	400	448	47	612	194	0	357	437
UNIC	15560	30	424	56	25	2600	0	150	162
RV	62200	0	917	104	646	3158	2	356	528
ARVN/UNIC/TOTAL	528990	1980	8541	544	4713	38289	184	3353	7996

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